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ABSTRACT
Population Movements in the Presence of Agglomeration and 
Congestion Effects:  Local Policy and the Social Optimum
We investigate the efficiency properties of population mobility when localities compete 
in an environment with local amenities and local externalities.  Our model is dynamic, 
incorporating land and labor markets in a context where firms and workers form rational 
expectations.  Concern focuses on whether and under what conditions the substantive 
conclusions from static models can be reinterpreted to apply in a dynamic context where 
moving is costly.  In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), it can be shown in static models that 
taxes or subsidies developed by each local jurisdiction representing the interests of 
landowners can induce an efficient population allocation even in the presence of local 
externalities.  We show that, in a dynamic model, efficiency of mobility requires that 
localities represent the interests of other local stakeholders, including residents and firms, 
as well as landowners.  Under certain circumstances, the dynamic model resolves 
problems of indeterminacy implicit in the static model due to multiple equilibria.  On the 
other hand, we also find that there may be multiple sets of equilibrium flows 
corresponding with alternative expectations.  We consider institutional arrangements that 
may facilitate preferred paths.
JEL Codes: H23, J61, R13, R5
Keywords: Local taxation, Population externalities, Migration
1I. Introduction
Following from the early work of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), an extended 
literature has examined how free movement of individuals and firms induces a static 
equilibrium distribution of wages and rents across locations in the presence of location-
specific consumption and production amenities.  Although the insights of static models in 
this tradition are substantial, Sjaastad (1961) noted quite early that migration is an 
investment, involving a comparison of the costs of mobility with future expected benefits.   
Yet the development of fully dynamic models of population redistribution with rational 
decision makers, especially as applied to questions of how the market performs in the 
face of externalities and political competition, has lagged.  The present paper extends the 
static strand of the literature by explicitly modeling land and labor markets in a dynamic 
context where mobility is costly and firms and workers form rational expectations about 
future opportunities.  Much of our concern focuses on whether several of the substantive 
conclusions from the static model can be reinterpreted to apply in a dynamic context.  
Although unconstrained movement will not generally produce an efficient population 
allocation in the presence of local agglomeration or congestion effects, it is known that 
competition between local jurisdictions in the spirit of Tiebout (1956) can induce an 
efficient population allocation.  We examine the conditions under which such a 
conclusion carries over to a setting with mobility costs.  We also consider the institutional 
arrangements and competition among locations that may develop to select among 
multiple equilibrium population paths.
In a static model incorporating land and labor markets, free movement by 
individuals and firms yields a social optimum provided there are no economies of scale or 
agglomeration, congestion costs, or other local externalities in the production of market 
goods or resident utility.1  In contrast, in the presence of these kinds of local externalities, 
the resulting population distribution need not be Pareto optimal, since the individual 
migration decision does not consider all effects on fellow residents.  Yet, if landowners at 
each location can vote to establish taxes and subsidies applying to local land and 
residents so as to maximize their own surplus, they will agree on a set of transfers that 
induce an efficient allocation of population across locations.2  Since, in equilibrium, 
residents and firms are indifferent between locations, they have no interest in the tax 
policies of any one locality.  It therefore appears plausible that landowners—who have 
direct financial interests—would be granted effective control of local taxes, and so the 
efficient outcome would prevail.
The primary focus of our analysis is to determine whether parallel conclusions 
regarding optimal population can obtain in a dynamic model, in which migration and 
employment adjustment are costly.  Here, the optimal choice must be considered in terms 
of the dynamic path, not merely the desirability of the steady-state equilibrium.  We first 
consider conditions under which levels of population redistribution occurring without 
                                                
1 Haurin (1980) finds that free mobility does not yield a socially optimal population distribution.  The 
important factor in producing this conclusion is his assumption that a portion of land rent is returned to 
tenants, essentially allocating land ownership on the basis of residency.  When Haurin considers the case 
where no rent is returned to tenants, he finds that the resulting population allocation is socially optimal.
2 This is essentially Henderson’s (1985a) result.  He considers optimal population in a locale where 
economies of scale in consumption result from the production of local public goods.  See also Wildasin 
(2006).
2local taxes or subsidies will be efficient.  As in the static model, necessary conditions for 
efficiency are met in the absence of local externalities despite the adjustment costs.  We 
then investigate whether local political structures can be established to assure the social 
optimum even in the presence of local externalities.  In contrast to the implication of the 
static model, in the dynamic case landowners will not necessarily make efficient taxation 
decisions.  In particular, their actions will exhibit a kind of dynamic inconsistency in 
which the interests of residents and firms already present in a location are undervalued.3  
However, we show that if taxes and subsidies can be determined in each locality by a 
coalition involving residents, firms, and property holders, the population redistribution 
among locations can be optimal.  Static models admit the possibility of multiple 
population steady-state equilibria.  There is no obvious way to choose between them, but 
in a dynamic model, we show it may be possible for migrant decisions to induce flows 
between locations that allow a preferable population steady state to be achieved.
Although there are relatively few studies that address dynamic efficiency issues, 
there is an extensive literature that considers economies of agglomeration and congestion 
costs to explain urban development and variation in settlement density.  Glaeser (2008, 
Chapter 4) provides a particularly useful treatment of agglomeration effects that admits 
the possibility of differences in inherent productivity and consumption amenities across 
locations and considers both theoretical models and analyses that attempt to empirically 
identify underlying relationships.
Among studies that examine the dynamics of population redistribution, Krugman 
(1991) presents a simplified model with agglomeration effects, multiple equilibria, and 
adjustment costs modeled similar to our approach.  He does not, however, address issues 
of efficiency or the role of local government policy.  Rauch (1993) also provides an 
analysis of the dynamics of firm location choice in a model with multiple equilibria and 
adjustment costs.  His analysis focuses on the role of developers, showing that they can 
often push the system toward efficient outcomes.  His detailed results depend on the 
particular specification of his model and the structure of adjustment costs, which are 
specified very differently from those here.  Several recent dynamic models do not lend 
themselves to a full efficiency analysis.  For example, the inefficiencies in Devillanova 
(2001) are the result of regional shocks, effectively removing any power that local 
governments might have to improve efficiency, as they have no more ability to predict 
the shocks than the citizens living in the community.4
Among the papers examining efficiency in models of dynamic population 
redistribution, Wildasin and Wilson (1996) present a model that is most similar to ours.5  
Still, there are three important differences between our model and that of Wildasin and 
Wilson that cause results to differ.  First, Wildasin and Wilson use an overlapping-
                                                
3 Henderson (1980) demonstrates such effects in a two-period model.  In a later paper focusing on which 
political structures can lead to an efficient solution, Henderson (1985b) reiterates the importance of these 
dynamic issues and poses several questions to be answered in the dynamic context.  The model developed 
in this paper provides answers to some of these questions.  For another interesting study that focuses on 
dynamic inconsistencies in this setting, see Richer (1995), whose model parallels the problem faced by a 
durable goods monopolist.
4 Chau (1997) and Glomm and Lagunoff (1999) also develop models with dynamic structures, but neither 
model is designed to consider the efficiency of the system.
5 The set-up of Zeng’s (2002) model is also quite similar to the set-up in our paper, but Zeng is concerned 
with equilibrium stability, not efficiency.
3generations model, in contrast to the model of infinitely-lived individuals in our paper.  
Second, they model moving costs in a very different way than they are modeled here, by 
assuming that moving is costless in the first period and varies across individuals in the 
second period.  Since the inefficiency in their model is the result of landowners extracting 
rents from the relatively “captive” older residents, this moving costs assumption is 
important to their results.
Finally, only landowners vote on local policy in the Wildasin and Wilson model.  
This assumption is motivated by the static model, where a landowner-controlled local 
government produces efficient results.  In our paper, the composition of the local 
government coalition is allowed to vary, with the result that the efficient solution can 
arise if a coalition of landowners, current residents, and firms determines policy.  Not 
only is this result substantively interesting, it also provides a more realistic description of 
local policymaking.
It is useful to place our work within the extensive literature that examines optimal 
taxation in the presence of potentially mobile factors of production.  In large part, the 
literature considers the case where a given factor is either mobile or immobile, and so the 
efficiency of mobility in the presence of moving costs is not considered.  There are some 
exceptions.  Wildasin (2003), for example, presents a model where taxes on a factor 
facing moving costs (in his model it is capital) are taken to benefit owners of the 
immobile factor.  His analysis addresses issues of competition and time consistency that 
are similar to those we address, and his results foreshadow ours.  However, the focus of
our analysis on the efficiency of population mobility and our investigation of the role of 
congestion or agglomeration effects in a fully dynamic optimizing model distinguishes 
our approach from his and others in this literature.
Our paper is organized as follows.  We present a benchmark static model in 
section II in which production and consumption are dependent on local resources.  The 
model also admits the possibility of local economies or diseconomies of agglomeration in 
population.  Sections III and IV consider how the competitive outcome compares with a 
social optimum, showing that free mobility produces a social optimum even in the 
presence of population agglomeration effects if landowners are permitted to act as a 
group to establish taxes or subsidies for residents.
Section V introduces a dynamic model that allows for migration costs for 
individuals as well as adjustment costs for firms.  The subsequent section investigates the 
welfare properties of the competitive outcome, and section VII shows how a social 
optimum may prevail if taxes or subsidies are determined by a local coalition.  Section 
VIII examines the issue of multiple equilibria.  Section IX concludes.
II. The Static Model
This section presents a static population distribution model that serves as a benchmark for 
the ultimate objective of analyzing a fully dynamic model.  The static benchmark follows 
Roback (1982) and Blomquist, et al. (1988) in that it assumes utility equalization across 
locations for residents and cost equalization across locations for firms to define an 
equilibrium population distribution.
4Residents/Migrants
Let ( , , , )hi i i iu c L a N be utility received by a representative resident in location i
from consumption ic (the numeraire) and household land use 
h
iL , when local 
consumption amenities are ia and aggregate local population is iN .  Like Roback, we 
ignore labor supply decisions and assume each resident or household supplies one unit of 
labor to the local market.  However, in contrast to Roback, we allow for the possibility 
that individual utility depends directly on the local population iN .  The impact may be 
positive, reflecting benefits in consumption from public goods or positive agglomeration 
effects in local service markets that are not explicitly included in our model, or it may be 
negative, reflecting congestion effects.
Taking the local wage iw and land rent ir as given, this resident receives indirect 
utility 
{ , }
( , , , )  ( , , , ) subject to max
h
i i
h h
i i i i i i i i i i i i
c L
U w r a N u c L a N c r L w   . (1)
We denote optimal household land demand in location i by ( , , , )h i i i iL w r a N .
Firms and Landowners
Assume constant returns in production at the firm level.  Then the aggregate 
output of firm k in location i can be written
( , , )f fk k k i iy N h L b N , (2)
where 
f
kN is the quantity of labor input, ( , , )
f
k i ih L b N is output per worker, a function of 
the quantity of land input per worker, fkL , exogenous local productive resources, indexed 
by ib , and population at the location, Ni.  We allow for the possibility that aggregate 
population at the location may influence unit cost but assume firms do not consider the 
effects of their actions on population (if any) when minimizing cost, so each individual 
firm faces a constant unit cost.  It is important to recall as the analysis proceeds that iN
in the production function h is an externality, not labor as a factor of production.
Constant returns implies that equilibrium profits are zero and output ky is 
determined by demand rather than by firm choice.  Hence, firm k chooses the inputs fkN
and fkL to minimize cost 
f f
k i i kN w r L   subject to the production constraint (2), so the 
firm’s problem can be expressed as choosing the land input to minimize cost per unit of 
output:
 ( , , , ) min ( , , )fk
f
i i k
i i i i f
L
k i i
w r L
C w r b N
h L b N
 . (3)
This optimization is independent of the firm k, so we drop the subscript and denote 
optimal firm land demand per worker in location i by ( , , , )f i i i iL w r b N .
The land supply in location i is fixed at iL , all of which is owned by a set of 
landowners who receive aggregate rent i irL , reflecting payments from both firms and 
residents.  Landowners consume the total value of payments received; for simplicity, we 
5do not allow them to consume land.  Since they are immobile, any benefits they receive 
from local amenities are not relevant.
Equilibrium
Free mobility implies that equilibrium utility equals a common level at all 
locations:
( , , , ) *,i i i iU w r a N U .i (4)
Equation (4) defines a horizontal labor supply curve in location i.  For given local 
amenities ia and population iN and a given land rental rate ir , a wage that exceeds the 
level defined by (4) will attract an infinite supply of labor into location i, while a wage 
below the level defined by (4) will drive all labor out of location i.
Assuming firms are competitive, the unit cost at each location must equal the 
equilibrium product price, which we have assumed is the numeraire:6
( , , , ) 1,  .i i i iC w r b N i  (5)
Equation (5) defines a horizontal labor demand curve in location i.  For given local 
productive resources ib and population iN and a given rent ir , a wage that exceeds the 
level defined by (5) will drive labor demand (and output) to zero in location i, while a 
wage below the level defined by (5) will cause firms in location i to demand an infinite 
amount of labor (and produce infinite output).   
Equilibrium in the land market requires that demand for land equal the local fixed 
supply, so:
[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )] ,h fi i i i i i i i i iN L w r a N L w r b N L  .i (6)
Equation (6) determines the equilibrium quantity of labor iN in location i, given the 
wage and land rental rate determined by (4) and (5).
Given *U , (4) – (6) determine the three equilibrating variables iw , ir , and iN for 
each occupied location i.  The values at any one location are tied to those at other 
locations because the equilibrium system utility level U* is endogenous, and population 
across all locations must add to an exogenous total N:
i
i
N N , (7)
where summation is across all locations.  So the system is (4) – (6) in the three unknowns 
(wi , ri , Ni) for each location, and one systemic equation (7) in the one systemic unknown 
*U .  We assume throughout that production and utility are “well-behaved” in the sense 
that (4) and (5) define a unique interior competitive equilibrium in (wi , ri) for a given iN .  
Nonetheless, there still may be multiple equilibria of the entire system because of the 
effects of iN through the per capita land endowment and its effects through the 
consumption and production externalities.
The conditions above assume that all locations are occupied; allowing for some 
locations to be vacant alters the conditions in expected ways.  In particular, unoccupied 
locations must offer utility to an arriving migrant that is no greater than *U and must 
                                                
6 Although it is common in the literature to describe (5) as a consequence of firm mobility, the same 
condition obtains if there is price-taking among firms in each locality.  We will maintain the latter 
interpretation because it eases discussion of the dynamic model.
6offer per unit costs to firms that are no smaller than unity.7  Just as in the case where we 
assume all locations are occupied, there may exist multiple equilibria; a location occupied 
in one equilibrium may not be occupied in another.  Since accommodating empty 
locations is tedious and adds essentially nothing to the results, the presentation will 
assume all locations are occupied. Our treatment allows locations to have extremely 
small numbers of residents in equilibrium, so the formal model we present can be 
structured to correspond as closely as desired to an environment with truly empty 
locations.
III. Pareto Efficiency in the Static Model
This section establishes that a competitive equilibrium in the benchmark static model 
cannot be Pareto optimal unless all locations have the same marginal net population 
externalities evaluated in terms of migrant utility.  This result has several implications.  
First, it is consistent with the first welfare theorem, and in fact a minor extension verifies 
the first welfare theorem (i.e., that a competitive equilibrium is efficient when there are 
no population externalities) for the benchmark static model under some additional 
assumptions.  Second, a competitive equilibrium can be efficient if it is symmetric across 
locations, even in the presence of externalities.  Third, the basic efficiency property leads 
naturally to the subsequent section, where we show that a tax/subsidy scheme operated by 
landowners generates an allocation that is consistent with a social optimum even when a 
competitive equilibrium in the absence of such a scheme would be inefficient.
A Pareto optimum for our purposes maximizes the income available to firms and 
landowners in one location, while assuring a fixed level of aggregate welfare to residents 
in all locations and a fixed level of income to firms and landowners in each other 
location, subject to the land and nationwide population resource constraints.  We do not 
allow the social planner to move consumption across locations.  This constraint is 
imposed in order to assure that individuals cannot consume resources in one area that 
have been produced in another.  Without such a constraint, the meaning of amenities in 
such a model would be lost. 
By stating the utility constraint in the aggregate, this statement of the Pareto 
problem may appear to omit the constraint that each individual resident or migrant 
receive a threshold utility level.  We ignore individual utility constraints because they are 
tedious in this model, requiring a full accounting system for each resident rather than 
only for the representative individual, and because individual utility constraints are 
unimportant to the conclusions.8  The important point is that residents “consume” the 
                                                
7 Rather than (4)-(6), for any location i that is not occupied, in addition to 0iN  , the following conditions 
hold: *( ,0, , 0)i iU w b U and ( ,0, ,0) 1i iC w b  .  This reflects the fact that in a vacant location land is not 
scarce, so ri=0.  These conditions can only be met if the marginal value of land in consumption and 
production approaches zero sufficiently fast as quantity of land increases.  Otherwise, firms and individuals 
will always find it worthwhile to occupy a location with at least a very small population, taking advantage 
of the high land-resident ratio corresponding with an infinitesimal population.
8 Essentially, we endow the social planner with the power to transfer utility between individuals in a given 
location.  One way to interpret this “transferable utility” condition is to think of a social planner who 
allocates individuals to live fractions of their time in various locations, without changing the population 
distribution, for time intervals whose lengths are chosen to accomplish any desired transfer. 
7household land allocation, local amenities, and population externality of the location 
from which their consumption is drawn.
Taking the location under study to be location 1 for convenience, a social 
optimum solves:
  1 1 1 1 1, , , ,max ( , , )h fi i ii
f
c L L N i
N h L b N c

   (8)
subject to
( , , , ) ,hi i i i i
i
N u c L a N u (9)
( , , ) ,  1fi i i i i iN h L b N c R i      (10)
,  h fi i i iN L L L i     (11)
i
i
N N , (12)
where u is the aggregate utility that must be provided to residents in all locations and iR
is the aggregate income that must be received by firms and landowners in location i.  The 
objective in (8) is the aggregate income of firms and landowners in the location under 
study, which, when maximized, can be allocated to firms and landowners as necessary to 
ensure a Pareto improvement for each of them relative to some initial allocation of 
income, as can any aggregate income satisfying (10) in the other locations.  (9) is the 
residents’ aggregate utility constraint.  (11) and (12) are the land and population resource 
constraints, respectively.
One necessary condition for efficiency is that the marginal rate of substitution 
equal the marginal rate of transformation between the land and non-land commodities in 
every location.  It is straightforward to establish that this occurs in a competitive 
equilibrium.  In particular, the solution to (1) equates the marginal rate of substitution to 
the price ratio,9
/h
ii
c iL
u u r ,  (13)
and the solution to (3) equates the marginal rate of transformation to the price ratio,
( , , , ) f
i
i i i i iL
C w r b N h r . (14)
So, using (5), we see that a competitive equilibrium in the static model efficiently 
allocates land and consumption for each location:
,  
h
i
f
i
i
L
L
c
u
h i
u
  .      (15)
In contrast, the competitive equilibrium allocation of population is not generally 
Pareto optimal.  Proposition 1 gives a necessary condition for Pareto optimality of a 
competitive equilibrium allocation.
                                                
9 Recall that consumption has price one.  Throughout, ,  ,  and h
i ii
N cL
u u u denote the partials of direct utility 
with respect to household land use, local population, and consumption, respectively, evaluated at the values 
for location i; and  and f
ii
NL
h h denote the partials of per capita production with respect to land per worker 
and local population, respectively, also evaluated at the values for location i.
8Proposition 1.10  If constraint qualification holds for the program (8) - (12), a necessary 
condition for the competitive equilibrium allocation to be a solution to this maximization 
program is
,  ,ji
i i j j
i j
NN
c i N c j N
c c
uu
u N h u N h i j
u u
  
     
      
, (16)
evaluated at the competitive equilibrium allocation.
Equation (16) is the population distribution condition necessary for a competitive 
equilibrium to be a social optimum.  The aggregate value of the net marginal externality 
in location i associated with one additional resident is i
i
i
N
i N
c
u
N h
u
 
 
  
.  Multiplying this by 
the marginal utility of consumption in location i gives the value of the net marginal 
externality in that location in terms of utility in that location.  So the result states that a 
competitive equilibrium cannot be efficient unless the utility values of all marginal net 
externalities are equated across locations in equilibrium.
A special case in which marginal net population externalities are equal across all 
locations is when there are no marginal agglomeration or congestion effects at the 
equilibrium (i.e., 0,  
i iN N
u h i   ).  In this case, Proposition 1 is consistent with the first 
welfare theorem for the static model, and verifies the first welfare theorem when the 
conditions of Proposition 1 are sufficient.11  Another special case in which the 
competitive equilibrium can be efficient is when locations are identical and the 
competitive equilibrium is symmetric, so that all locations are subject to the same 
agglomeration or congestion effects.
It is widely argued that the existence of large cities demonstrates the importance 
of positive agglomeration effects.  On the other hand, it seems equally likely that, as 
population grows, congestion effects become important.  If locations differ in terms of 
inherent attractiveness, the common equilibrium level of utility may well be attained at 
all locations when location populations are inducing unequal marginal agglomeration 
externalities.  If so, Proposition 1 shows that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient.
IV. Static Efficiency and Local Politics
A subsidy or tax on residents, depending on whether there are economies or 
diseconomies of agglomeration, can remedy the potential inefficiency caused by 
externalities.  If subsidies are needed to neutralize externalities, the subsidies can be
financed via an excise tax on land with no social loss.  Similarly, if taxes are needed, the 
revenues can be given to landowners without creating a distortion.  Moreover, if 
landowners at each location are residual claimants of local resident taxes or subsidies, 
they will make tax/subsidy decisions that satisfy the necessary conditions for efficiency.  
                                                
10 Unless otherwise indicated, formal proofs for all propositions are in the appendix.
11 Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Theorem M.K.3 gives an exact statement of the curvature conditions that assure 
sufficiency.  It is possible that the equilibrium is a local but not a global welfare maximum.  We wish to 
allow for this latter possibility because we are concerned about the behavior of the system when there are 
positive population agglomeration effects over some range but negative population congestion effects over 
some other range.
9Perfectly inelastic land supply and the independence of landowner decisions across 
locations drive this result.
Formally, let ix be a per-capita net subsidy paid to residents in location i , with 
this expense covered out of the revenues of location i landowners (they receive payments 
if xi is negative).  Then the budget constraint for a resident of i is
h
i i i i ic rL w x   ,    (17)
so wi + xi replaces wi in the household land demand and indirect utility functions.  Noting 
that the equilibrium values of wi , ri and Ni now depend on xi, the equilibrium conditions 
(4) – (6) become
( ( ) , ( ), , ( )) *i i i i i i i iU w x x r x a N x U  , (18)
( ( ), ( ), , ( )) 1i i i i i i iC w x r x b N x  , and   (19)
( ) ( ( ) , ( ), , ( )) ( ( ), ( ), , ( ))h fi i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iN x L w x x r x a N x L w x r x b N x L     . (20)
The efficiency of the land and consumption allocation in a location does not change with 
the subsidy, so (15) continues to hold in the subsidy-induced equilibrium, but (16) is 
modified by the marginal utility value of the subsidy.
Corollary to Proposition 1. When xi is in the model, the necessary condition of 
Proposition 1 is
,  ,ji
i i j j
i j
NN
c i N i c j N j
c c
uu
u N h x u N h x i j
u u
                  
           
, (21)
evaluated at the subsidized equilibrium allocation.
Now consider landowners who control the local political process and thereby 
choose the subsidy level for location i, but who also serve as the sink for financing local 
government.  We assume they take as given the utility provided in other locations.  Their 
maximization problem may be written as:
{ }
max[ ( ) ( ) ].
i
i i i i i i
x
r x L N x x (22)
Proposition 2.  Assuming an interior solution, the landowners’ optimal value of ix
satisfies
i
i
i
N
i i N
c
u
x N h
u
 
  
  
. (23)
The necessary condition for efficiency (21) holds in an equilibrium with 
tax/subsidy given by (23) because the landowners’ revenue-maximizing plan perfectly 
offsets the agglomeration effects in their locality that might keep (16) from holding in the 
no-subsidy, competitive environment.  Hence, the landowners’ subsidy plan guarantees 
the competitive equilibrium can be efficient even when there are asymmetric 
agglomeration or congestion effects across locations in equilibrium.
The substantive conclusion of this exercise is that local economies or 
diseconomies of agglomeration, whether they affect firm production of goods and/or 
resident utility, are properly internalized by landowners.  Although this general result has 
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been shown in other models,12 it is worthwhile to stress its importance.  The interests of 
residents and firms are fully protected by the competition among locations because 
residents are fully mobile and firms earn zero profits regardless of local—or system—
policy.  In contrast, property owners have a direct common interest in maintaining 
revenue-maximizing policies, which suggests why they might obtain effective political 
power.
Several important caveats must be recognized in these strong conclusions.  First, 
the efficiency condition (21) is necessary but not sufficient.  This might be viewed as a 
mostly technical issue that can be solved with additional assumptions (see footnote 11).  
However, given agglomeration or congestion effects, there may be multiple population 
distributions that satisfy (21), and there is no obvious way to assure that the competitive 
outcome achieved is the global maximum.  We know only that there is a local tax/subsidy 
policy that neutralizes the obvious source of inefficiency—the marginal population 
externalities—and that such a policy satisfies necessary conditions to maximize 
landowners’ rents.
Equally important, there is no obvious way for landowners to choose a particular 
equilibrium over another.  When there are multiple equilibria, the tax scheme associated 
with the optimum may also be associated with another (suboptimal) equilibrium.  Given 
the structure of the static model, it is difficult to see what actions landowners could take 
to induce the preferable equilibrium.  This issue can be addressed in a dynamic model in 
which an initial population distribution and future expectations play an explicit role.  In 
particular, when the current population distribution corresponds to an inferior 
equilibrium, perhaps forward-looking individuals will migrate toward an area in 
anticipation that population agglomeration effects will ultimately dominate, moving the 
system toward a preferable distribution.
Finally, these conclusions do not consider the costs individuals might incur in 
moving between locations, or adjustment costs associated with expanding or reducing 
employment.  If there are such costs, then residents and firms at a location are, to some 
degree, “captive,” which may make designing optimal policies more difficult.  It is no 
surprise that local area political conflicts generally involve those who, because of 
circumstance or sunk investments, are strongly tied to a location.  A model that assumes 
free mobility ignores this critical element that underlies local area political processes and 
that may influence the locality’s growth policy.
V. A Dynamic Model
This section presents a continuous-time dynamic model with well-behaved marginal 
migration and employment adjustment costs while retaining the spirit of the static model 
reviewed in the previous sections.  The dynamic model enables investigation of efficient 
local policies when there are costs associated with population redistribution.  It is a 
rational expectations model in that both firms and workers have perfect foresight 
concerning all future values.
The dynamic analog to utility equalization across locations assumed in the static 
models of Roback (1982) and Blomquist et al. (1988) is that net migration be toward 
more desirable areas, with migration continuing until utility differences disappear.  Firms 
                                                
12 See Henderson (1985a) and Wildasin (2006).
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expand when cumulative future profits are positive and shrink when profits are negative.  
As in the static model, we assume firms are price-takers in each location but note that, 
due to employment adjustment costs, they no longer have constant returns to scale; hence 
equilibrium profits are nonzero in general.  The perfect foresight assumption implies that 
correctly anticipated future utilities and costs are the relevant decision parameters for 
migration and labor input adjustment decisions.13  Prices, location attributes, and 
quantities are all allowed to vary over time in the dynamic model,14 so the economic 
actors must now optimize by considering time paths ( ),iw t ( ),ir t ( ),ia t ( ),ib t and ( )iN t
for all locations i.
Residents/Migrants
A representative individual has the same instantaneous maximization problem as 
in the static model, optimally allocating current income flows between consumption and 
land use at each point in time.  The only difference is that utility is quasilinear,15 with 
instantaneous indirect utility for an individual in location i at time t given as:
{ ( ), ( )}
ˆ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) max ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
h
i i
h
i i i i i i i i i
c t L t
U w t r t a t N t Ac t u L t a t N t  (24)
subject to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )hi i i iw t c t r t L t  ,
where the function uˆ is utility from land consumption, location amenities and the 
population externality; and iA is implicitly part of the vector ia .  Instantaneous optimal 
household land demand in location i parallels that of the static case, and is denoted 
( ( ), ( ), ( ))h i i iL r t a t N t .
16
Note that each resident’s budget constraint is assumed to hold at each point in 
time.  This assumption has no significance within a location because static quasilinear 
utility, with the location attribute iA invariant over time, cannot be improved by moving 
consumption across time within a location.  The assumption that economic actors cannot 
move consumption across locations is significant because otherwise migrants will have 
incentives to make moves that do not correspond with differences in location lifetime 
utility.  For example, consider two locations that offer different levels of amenities and 
wage differences such that the locations provide equal levels of lifetime utility.  An 
individual who can move consumption between these locations will be able to increase 
lifetime utility relative to staying in either location by dividing his time between them.  
Although such “commuting” may be of importance in some contexts (see Mueser, 1997), 
the purpose here is to formulate a dynamic model in the spirit of static models such as 
Roback (1982) and Blomquist et al. (1988) in which migration is driven solely by 
                                                
13 Empirical applications based on models with this basic structure include Mueser and Graves (1995) and 
Rappaport (2004).
14 We assume for simplicity that the land and total population endowments are fixed over time.  Allowing 
these resources to vary would not change our substantive conclusions.
15 The quasilinear static utility assumption with constant marginal utility of consumption over time is made 
in order to avoid issues of consumption smoothing.  Quasilinear utility allows us to assume that migrants 
simply pay moving costs with a lump-sum adjustment to consumption at the point in time when the 
migration occurs, as there is no benefit of spreading out payment over time.
16 Note that wi(t) does not enter this function because of the quasilinear utility structure.
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lifetime utility differences across locations.  The assumption that migrants cannot move 
consumption across location is implicit in (24).
Lifetime utility is additively separable over continuous time with discount rate  .  
The utility received by an individual living in location i from time t onward is:
( )( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) s ti i i i i
t
V t U w s r s a s N s e ds

   . (25)
Krugman (2006) observes that migration flows respond smoothly to differences in 
location desirability, suggesting that individual migration costs are increasing in the level 
of net migration.  In order to capture this dynamic, we take moving cost for one 
individual when moving from location i to j as
( ( )) ( ( ))i i j jk M t k M t  , (26)
where ( )iM t is the net flow of migrants into location i at time t , (0) 0ik  , and 0ik  .17  
The costs of leaving an area increase if there are more individuals leaving, while the costs 
of moving into a location increase if it attracts more net arrivals. As discussed above, 
our interest is in a world in which consumption cannot be moved across locations.  Hence 
we assume the cost an individual incurs in leaving location i , ( ( ))i ik M t , is paid out of 
consumption in location i , while the cost of moving into j , ( ( ))j jk M t , is paid out of 
consumption in location j .  Moving costs are assumed to be paid as a lump sum.
Subject to these moving costs, residents have free choice of movement, in 
addition to their instantaneous consumption and land use choices.  Given homogeneous 
residents at any one location, free choice of movement implies that each resident is 
optimized choosing location i at time t if and only if the costs of moving exactly 
compensate for the difference in realized utility between locations.  Given that each
resident takes aggregate net migration as given, resident optimality requires18
( ) ( ) [ ( ( )) ( ( ))]   ,   ,i j j j j i i iV t V t A k M t A k M t t i j     . (27)
The term in brackets identifies the utility cost of moving from i to j, with costs translated 
into the utility units of the location in which they are paid (see (24) and (25)).
                                                
17 These costs are intrinsic migration costs, not government payments designed to influence migration.  
This formulation implies positive migration costs for any individual who moves in a way consistent with 
net migration between two locations.  For example, if net migration is out of i ( ( ) 0iM t  ) and into j
( ( ) 0jM t  ) at time t then both terms of (26) are positive.  This formal structure implies that moves 
against net migration incur a negative cost.  Although conceptually possible, such moves are of no 
significance in the model, so it can be assumed without loss of generality the no such moves occur.
18 As in the static model, it is possible to modify the dynamic model to allow for locations with no 
population, or no population at certain times.  Here it is necessary to keep track of the exact periods in 
which locations are empty.  A location only remains empty for a specified period if, with land at price zero, 
the flow of utility never exceeds the flow available elsewhere—in the absence of any moving costs 
associated with arriving in the location—and if firms cannot produce at costs below unity, ignoring 
adjustment costs.  Rather than complicating the formal analysis to allow for empty locations, we will 
assume all location have nonzero population at all times as we did in the static analysis.  Even with this 
assumption, the model allows for locations to have extremely small populations (at all or at selected times), 
so there is no substantive loss to this assumption.
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Firms
A representative firm has the same instantaneous production structure as in the 
static model, except that now firms must consider adjustment costs when they change 
employment levels.  We assume firm k choosing labor force growth ( )fkN t in location 
i incurs twice differentiable strictly convex adjustment cost ( ( ))fk kN t  , where 
(0) (0) 0k k     and 0k   .19  This implies ( ( )) and ( )f fk k kN t N t     have the same 
sign.  This firm’s maximization problem at time t is:
{ ( ), ( )}
( )
max { ( )[ ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( ( ))} .
f f
k k
f f f
k k i i k i i
N s L s
t
f s t
k k
N s h L s b s N s L s r s w s
N s e ds

 
 

    

            (28)
All the terms in (28) correspond to those defined in the static model, except that they 
reference flows.  The term in brackets is production (the numeraire) minus land rent and 
wages, all expressed per employee, whereas the last term inside the braces is the cost of 
adjusting employment.
The land input has no dynamics in this objective, so land use is optimized by 
choosing the instantaneous maximum at each point in time.  Therefore optimal firm land 
use per employee fkL satisfies:
( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ),   .f
k
f
k i i iL
h L s b s N s r s s   (29)
This condition is independent of k due to constant returns, even if firms have different 
employment levels at time s, so all firms in location i choose the same level of land use 
per worker, and instantaneous land demand per worker can be denoted 
( ( ), ( ), ( ))f i i iL r s b s N s .
Instantaneous cost per unit of output is then:20
( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) ,
( )
f
i i i i i
i i i i i
i
w s r s L r s b s N s
C s C w s r s b s N s
h s
  (30)
where ( ) ( ( ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ), ( ))fi i i i i ih s h L r s b s N s b s N s .
Lemma 1.  The path ( )fkN s that solves (28) satisfies:
( )( ( )) ( )[1 ( )] ,   f s tk k i i
t
N t h s C s e ds t

     . (31)
                                                
19 Although 
k may differ across firms, we do not allow it to vary with fkN .  This is consistent with the 
assumption of constant returns to scale in production, which assures that the value of an additional 
employee in production does not vary with f
kN .
20 In contrast to the static model, per unit cost does not equal price at all times.  Indeed, aggregate profit can 
be either positive or negative for individual firms, depending on their initial employment levels and their 
adjustment cost functions.  This is because adjustment costs make it costly for a firm to instantaneously 
change its scale of operation; losses may occur because firms are not permitted to costlessly shut down.  
Land use is chosen to equate the marginal revenue product and input price of land at each point in time, as 
specified by (29), and then the scale of operation at each point in time is determined by choosing the entire 
employment path to maximize the present value of profit, taking into account adjustment costs.
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The left side of (31) is the cost of increasing employment by one additional person at 
time t .  The right side is the aggregate future benefit of having one more employee, who 
increases output by hi(s) at each time s > t.
As k appears only on the left side of (31), different firms k in a given location i
have different employment growth rates only if their adjustment cost functions differ, and 
individual profit-seeking causes firms to equalize their marginal adjustment costs.  
Equalization of marginal adjustment costs implies that aggregate adjustment cost in 
location i incurred by firms can be expressed as a function of aggregate labor adjustment 
in location i, and the marginal aggregate adjustment cost evaluated at aggregate labor 
adjustment is the same as the equalized marginal adjustment costs of the individual firms.  
In particular, let ( )fiN t denote the aggregate labor adjustment in location i at time t,
( ) ( )f fi k
k
N t N t    ,     (32)
where the summation is over all firms k in location i, and let '( ( ))fi iN t be the aggregate 
adjustment cost when aggregate labor adjustment is ( )fiN t and firms equate marginal 
adjustment costs as in (31).
Lemma 2.  The equilibrium change in aggregate instantaneous labor demand in location i
at time t satisfies
( )( ( )) ( )[1 ( )]f s ti i i i
t
N t h s C s e ds

          (33)
for an aggregate adjustment cost function '( ( ))fi iN t with the same properties as the 
individual-firm adjustment cost functions (i.e., (0) (0) 0 and 0i i i      ).
As noted in footnote 20, firms may have a positive or negative profit flow at any 
point in time, and the present value of profit may be positive or negative.  For simplicity, 
we assume that firm owners consume all profits—whether positive or negative—and that 
they do not consume land.  At each point in time, their concern is exclusively the present 
value of profits.  This approach abstracts from issues of firm financing and asset 
accumulation, which are outside the scope of this model.
Landowners and Owners of Moving Resources
As in the static model, landowners are individually passive, merely spending for 
non-land consumption the payments received from firms and residents for use of land.
Equation (27) specifies that individual migrants pay the marginal cost of their 
migration decisions.  If increasing marginal costs (i.e., k’>0) reflect congestion or other 
agglomeration effects, each mover would impose an externality on all others.  In this 
case, we would not expect individual decisions to produce the social optimum.  Since our 
focus is on local population-based externalities (as opposed to externalities in the act of 
migrating), we wish to remove this potential source of inefficiency.  We therefore posit 
that increasing marginal costs result from an upward sloping supply curve of moving 
services faced by a competitive moving industry.21  
                                                
21 We note below how our conclusions would differ if migration costs were due to congestion effects.
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We may assume either that the moving firms control the supply of all relevant 
resources or that they purchase the relevant resources in competitive markets.22  In the 
former case, moving firms earn positive rents from their resource ownership.  In the latter 
case, free entry of moving firms under constant returns to scale at the firm level assures 
that moving firms make zero profits, but owners of the resources used in the moving 
process receive rents.  In either case, we refer to those who receive the surplus as owners 
of moving resources, and assume they consume their surplus directly.  They do not 
consume land.
Like owners of firms, landowners and owners of moving resources are assumed 
tied to their locations.  We have chosen not to distribute ownership across migrants or to 
have individuals own resources in more than one location for two primary reasons.  First, 
since we wish to focus on local policy decisions, it is useful to unambiguously identify 
these actors’ interests with a particular location.  Second, allowing ownership dispersion 
raises the issue of how to model consumption by a given economic actor at a single point
in time of goods produced at more than one location.  As noted above, we constrain 
migrants to consume goods produced in a given location only while they are resident 
there.  It is simplest to merely assign other actors to a single location.  Although it would 
be possible to consider alternative ownership structures, and to adjust consumption 
accordingly, we see no benefits accruing from the additional complications.23
Equilibrium
Instantaneous equilibrium in location i at time t is defined by simultaneous 
market-clearing in both the land and labor markets.  There are no dynamics in land use 
decisions by either migrants or firms, so in equilibrium the instantaneous aggregate 
demand for land equals the fixed supply of land at every point in time, just as in the static 
model:
( )[ ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))]h fi i i i i i i iN t L r t a t N t L r t b t N t L  , t . (34)
Equilibrium in the labor market is more complicated because it is dynamic.  
Migrant choices create a flow of labor into or out of a location which must equal the 
change in labor demanded by firms.  Dynamic labor supply is derived from optimal 
migration decisions as expressed in (27), which implies there is a common value *( )V t
across locations satisfying
( ) ( ( )) *( )i i i iV t A k M t V t  , i .
*( )V t plays the same role as U* in the static model.  It is a systemic path that is 
determined in equilibrium by the population resource constraint.  Equilibrium net 
migration ( )iM t in each location i and at each time t satisfies
( ) *( )
( ( )) ii i
i
V t V t
k M t
A
 . (35)
                                                
22 We assume the relevant resources are outside the model in the sense that the land and non-land 
consumption goods in the model are not used to produce moving services.
23 If ownership rights were conferred to migrants and permitted to vary on the basis of residency, as in 
Haurin (1980), this would alter our model substantially.  As noted above, such a structure in essence 
eliminates markets and so induces inefficiency.  
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The migrant optimality condition (35) implicitly gives the equilibrium change in labor 
supply ( )iM t in a location at a given time t.
Equation (35) implies some properties of dynamic labor supply.  Net migration 
into location i at time t increases when the utility value of location i from time t
onward, ( )iV t , increases relative to the net system utility of other locations at time t , 
*( )V t , i.e., 0i
i
M
V
 

holding *( )V t constant.  Because (0) 0ik  , migrant choice
implies positive (negative) net migration for any location providing utility above (below)
*( )V t , and zero net migration for any location providing exactly *( )V t .  Net migration 
does not have these properties if, for example, the cost of movement between a pair of 
locations is a fixed fee that does not vary with changes in the rate of migration.  A 
specification like (26), in which migration costs vary smoothly with the level of net 
migration, is required for net migration to be responsive to marginal changes in relative 
desirability.
Instantaneous equilibrium in the labor market requires that dynamic labor supply 
as specified by (35) equal dynamic labor demand as specified by (33). That is, 
( ) ( )fi iM t N t , or:
1 1 ( )( ) *( ) ( )[1 ( )] ,  s tii i i i
i t
V t V t
k h s C s e ds t
A


          
    .
24 (36)
Instantaneous equilibrium in the labor market can be expressed in the standard supply 
and demand form (36), in contrast to the static model, because migration costs make 
changes in labor supply upward sloping as a function of the instantaneous wage, and firm 
adjustment costs make changes in labor demand downward sloping as a function of the 
instantaneous wage.  This also creates the possibility of nonzero equilibrium profits.
Note that the instantaneous labor market equilibrium condition (36) involves the 
future paths of population, wages and rents in location i because
( )( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) s ti i i i i
t
V t U w s r s a s N s e ds

   , 
( ) ( ( ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ), ( ))fi i i i i ih s h L r s b s N s b s N s , and ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ))i i i i iC s C w s r s b s N s .  The 
paths of wages and rents adjust in equilibrium to make the instantaneous labor supply and 
demand choices of firms and migrants consistent, and to make their static land demand 
choices consistent with the fixed supply of land.  Together, (34) and (36) define the wage 
and rent paths that simultaneously clear the land and labor markets at each instant of 
time, given a population level Ni(t) and a systemic utility level *( )V t at that instant.
The assumption that residents’ labor supply is inelastic means 
( ) ( ) ( )fi i iN t M t N t   .  This relates the instantaneous labor market equilibrium quantity, 
which is a flow of population, to the existing stock of population Ni(t).  Hence
1 1 ( )( ) *( )( ) ( )[1 ( )] ,  s tii i i i i
i t
V t V t
N t k h s C s e ds t
A


           
    . (37)
                                                
24 Both inverse functions in (36) exist because ik and i  are strictly increasing.
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(37) is the equation of motion that ties the instantaneous equilibria together over time.
Just as in the static model, the systemic population resource constraint
( )  i
i
N N t t                                                        (38)
completes the definition of equilibrium, where we assume for simplicity that aggregate 
population is constant over time.  So the whole system consists of three instantaneous 
equilibrium conditions, (34) and the two sides of (37), in the three paths wi(s), ri(s), 
and ( )iN s ; and one systemic equation (38) that determines the systemic path *( )V t .
VI. Pareto Efficiency in the Dynamic Model
The dynamic model retains some of the efficiency properties that constitute a hallmark of 
the static model.  We have confirmed that the static model is consistent with the first 
welfare theorem and, more generally, that a competitive equilibrium can be efficient if 
there is full symmetry across locations.  Moreover, we have shown that a competitive 
equilibrium must be inefficient in the static model if the marginal net population 
externality in equilibrium is not the same across locations.  These results carry over to the 
dynamic model, for essentially the same reasons as in the static model.  
In contrast, the result from the literature based on static models that Pareto 
efficiency can be achieved, even in the presence of externalities and location 
asymmetries, via landowner-controlled tax/subsidy schemes (Henderson, 1985a; 
Wildasin, 2006), does not hold in the dynamic setting.  The dynamic model efficiency 
results of the present section are used in the next section to show that fundamentally 
different local politics and policies are needed to address the competitive equilibrium 
inefficiency that can occur in an explicitly dynamic asymmetric setting with population 
externalities.  Landowner-controlled local governments will not adopt efficiency-
inducing policies in general, but tax/subsidy policies designed by local coalitions of 
landowners, firms, and residents may indeed overcome the potential inefficiency of a 
competitive equilibrium.
A Pareto optimum in the dynamic model for our purposes maximizes the income 
available to firms, landowners, and owners of moving services in one location; while 
assuring the portion of output and land allocated to residents’ consumption in each 
location at each time delivers fixed aggregate resident/migrant welfare over all locations, 
and a fixed level of income to firms, landowners, and owners of moving services in each 
other location; subject to the land and nationwide population resource constraints.  This 
statement of the Pareto problem differs from the statement used for the static model only 
in that we include owners of moving services.  Owners of scarce moving services earn 
rents in the dynamic economy, so their income must be counted. As there are no capital 
constraints, maximization is always in terms of present values, calculated at each 
location.
The social planner has control over the paths of population and the consumption 
and land allocation paths within each location but cannot avoid the costs of moving 
residents and adjusting production levels at each location.  Corresponding to the 
constraint faced by migrants and firms, the planner cannot move consumption across 
locations.
Taking the location under study to be location 1 for convenience, a social 
optimum beginning at time t solves
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1
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
1 10
{ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),  }
max ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
                                                       ( ) ( ( ))
fh
i i ii
f
N s s t
Z s L s L s N s i t
N s h L s b s N s Z s
k m dm N s e ds  


 
  

(39)
subject to
( )ˆ[ ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))]h s ti i i i i i
ti
A Z s N s u L s a s N s e ds V

   (40)
( ) ( )
0
( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )
                       ( ) ( ( )) ,  1
i
f
i i i i i
t
N s s t
i i i i
N s h L s b s N s Z s
k m dm N s e ds R i

  
 
    

(41)
( ) ( ) ( ) ,  ,   h fi i i iN s L s L s L i s t       (42)
( ) ,   i
i
N s N s t   (43)
0( ) ( ),  ,i iN t N t i  (44)
where ( )iZ s is the flow of aggregate consumption allocated to residents in location i at 
time s. ( )iZ s differs from the aggregate consumption flow ( ) ( )i iN s c s received by 
residents in location i in a competitive equilibrium because in a competitive equilibrium 
migrants who arrive in location i must pay aggregate moving costs of ( ) ( ( ))i i iN s k N s  , 
whereas a social planner merely chooses an allocation to satisfy a utility threshold (and 
other constraints).  A social planner does not bother with the monetary economy and 
therefore has no reason to identify moving costs paid by migrants separately from the 
total resources used in the course of moving.  V is the present value of aggregate utility 
that must be provided to residents in all locations from time t onward, and iR is the 
present value of aggregate income that must be provided to firms, landowners, and 
owners of moving services in location i from time t onward.  0( )iN t is the initial 
population in location i.
The first term of the integrand in (39) is aggregate production and the second term 
is the part that is allocated to residents/migrants.  Together, these two terms are analogous 
to the two terms in the static welfare objective (8).  The third term (i.e., the integral of 1k ) 
is aggregate resource costs of net migration and the last term is aggregate firm net 
adjustment costs.  So the integrand in (39) is the aggregate production available at time s
to firms, landowners, and owners of moving services in location 1, net of the amount 
allocated to residents/migrants and net of migration costs.  The present value of this 
excess production can be allocated to firms, landowners, and owners of moving services 
as necessary to ensure a Pareto improvement for each of them relative to some initial 
allocation, as can any aggregate excess production satisfying (41) in the other locations.
As in the static model (see equation (9)), the utility constraint (40) does not 
explicitly impose the constraint that each individual resident or migrant receive a 
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threshold utility level.  Tracking each individual’s moves would be exceptionally tedious 
and would add nothing to the conclusions.25  (42) and (43) are the land and population 
resource constraints, respectively, and (44) is the initial condition.
As in the static model, one necessary condition for efficiency is that the marginal 
rate of substitution equal the marginal rate of transformation between the land and non-
land commodities in each location at each point in time.  Also as in the static model, it is 
straightforward to establish that this occurs in a competitive equilibrium.  In particular, 
(29) and the solution to (24) yield  
   ˆ ( ), ( ), ( )( ), ( ), ( ) hif
i
h
i i iLf
i i iL
i
u L s a s N s
h L s b s N s
A
      (45)
in equilibrium.
However, again analogous to the static model, the level of migration that obtains 
in the competitive equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal.  Proposition 3 gives a 
necessary condition for Pareto optimality of a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 3.  If constraint qualification26 holds for the program (39) – (44), a necessary 
condition for the competitive equilibrium allocation to be a solution to this maximization 
program is
( )
( )
ˆ[ ( ) ( )] ( )
ˆ                              [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ,   , ,   ,
i i
j j
s t
N i N i
s t
N j N j
u s A h s N s e ds
u s A h s N s e ds i j t





  
  
 
   


(46)
evaluated at the competitive equilibrium allocation.
Equation (46) is the population distribution condition necessary for a dynamic 
competitive equilibrium to be a social optimum.  It is identical to the static condition 
given in Proposition 1, except that the aggregate value of the net marginal externality in 
each location is now explicitly a present value, and the marginal utilities of income are 
the constants iA due to the assumption of quasilinear utility.  The interpretation is 
identical as well: a competitive equilibrium cannot be efficient unless the marginal net 
population externalities have equal marginal utility values across locations.  It follows 
immediately, just as in the static model, that Proposition 3 is consistent with the first 
welfare theorem27 and that fully symmetric equilibria can be optimal.  The dynamic 
model also reinforces the conclusion that a competitive equilibrium may not be efficient 
in the presence of externalities when locations are not symmetric.
                                                
25 The social planner has the same ability to transfer utility among individuals as in the static model.  This 
power is consistent with the formal dynamic model, which specifies costs associated with net, as opposed 
to gross, migration, in effect allowing costless mobility so long as net migration is not affected.  Given a 
location-specific allocation satisfying (40), the social planner can move individuals across locations, 
thereby manipulating gross migration, to achieve any collection of individual utility thresholds that 
aggregate to V .
26 That is, the constraints are “independent” or “consistent” in the sense discussed by Chiang (1992, section 
6.1).
27 As noted above, if migration costs were derived from congestion effects, we would not attain efficiency 
even in the absence of population externalities.
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VII. Dynamic Efficiency and Local Politics
If local property owners can tax or subsidize local residents in the static model, the 
landowners’ decision will induce a population distribution that is consistent with Pareto 
efficiency.  This is because competition between landowners at different locations 
removes their monopoly power, so that in setting taxes/subsidies for residents they 
maximize the aggregate surplus.  Residents are protected by their ability to choose freely 
among locations.
In the dynamic model, residents can no longer move costlessly between locations.  
Firms and owners of moving services, as well as landowners, earn location-specific rents, 
as do initial residents.  In this setting, if landowners control tax policy, they will have 
incentives to set policies that extract surplus from residents (who must pay costs to 
depart), as well as to redistribute other location-specific rents to themselves.  These 
factors distort landowners’ decisions even when there are no population externalities, so 
the political efficiency result in static migration models is not robust to the introduction 
of explicit dynamics.  Instead, tax/subsidy policies will ensure that the necessary 
conditions for efficiency are satisfied only if the policies are designed by coalitions of 
landowners, firms, owners of moving services, and residents.  The interests of all those 
who receive location-specific rents must be represented in the local polity.
Formally, let ( )ix s be a per-capita net subsidy flow paid to residents in location i
at time s.  Then the budget constraint for the residents’ problem is
              ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),hi i i i ic s r s L s w s x s   (47)
so ( ) ( )i iw s x s replaces ( )iw s in the indirect utility function.  Among the equilibrium 
conditions (34), (37), and (38), only the left side of (37) is affected by this change.  
Substituting for ( )iV t , it becomes
( )( ( )) ( ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) *( ),  s ti i i i i i i i
t
A k N t U w s x s r s a s N s e ds V t t

      . (48)
This changes the equilibrium paths ( ),  ( ),  ( ) and *( )i i iw s r s N s V s as well as the 
allocation of land and consumption.  The efficiency of the land and consumption 
allocation in a location does not change with the subsidy, so (45) continues to hold in the 
subsidy-induced competitive equilibrium, but (46) is modified by the marginal utility 
value of the subsidy flows.  Pareto optimality in the presence of the subsidy requires that 
the subsidized marginal net population externalities be equal across locations.
Corollary to Proposition 3.  When xi(s) is in the model, the necessary condition of 
Proposition 3 is
( )
( )
ˆ{[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )}
ˆ                 {[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )} ,   , ,   ,
i i
j j
s t
N i N i i i
s t
N j N j j j
u s A h s N s A x s e ds
u s A h s N s A x s e ds i j t





  
  
  
    


(49)
   evaluated at the subsidized equilibrium allocation.
Now consider landowners who control the local political process and also serve as 
the sink for financing local government, just as in the static model.  If there is a 
population already in place in the location when landowners make this decision, given the 
existence of moving costs, landowners have an incentive to exploit residents by imposing 
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taxes on them.  This complicating incentive obscures understanding of the relationship 
between the local polity and Pareto efficiency, so we begin by analyzing landowners’ 
incentives in a context where they do not have this incentive.  In particular, assume that 
all residents are migrants from other locations who have been provided with a binding 
contract specifying the path of taxes or subsidies they will face in the new location.  
Landowners are therefore forced to account for the effects of their taxes or subsidies on 
all earlier migration decisions, there is no pre-existing captive population, and the binding 
nature of the contract eliminates any potential dynamic inconsistency in landowner 
behavior.  
The total tax/subsidy at time s is ( ) ( )i ix s N s , so the dynamic analog to the 
landowners’ objective (22) in the static model is:
  ( )
{ ( )}
max ( ) ( ) ( )
i
s t
i i i i
x s
t
L r s x s N s e ds

  (50)
subject to ( ) 0iN t  (all residents are migrants), and subject to the equilibrium conditions 
(34), (48), and the right side of (37) since wi(s), ri(s), and Ni(s) are endogenous paths.
Proposition 4.  The subsidy flow ( )ix s that solves (50) and the associated constraints 
must satisfy28
                  
( ) ( )
ˆ ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
                                ( )[ ( ( )) ( ( ))],  .
i
i
Ns s
i i N
i
i i i i i
u s
x s e ds N s h s e ds
A
N k N N t
   
 
    

   
    
 
       
                        (51)
The solution to (50) does not generally satisfy the necessary condition for Pareto 
optimality given by (49) in the Corollary to Proposition 3.  Equation (51) shows that the 
landowners’ optimal subsidy path fails to neutralize population externalities, in present 
value, by an amount that depends on moving costs and employment adjustment costs.  
The extra term is the amount of migration, ( )iN  , multiplied by the change in the 
marginal cost of migration when the amount of migration changes.  This gives the 
inframarginal value of a change in the “price” of migration, when migration is valued at 
its marginal cost.  The first component, ( ( ))i ik N   , is the rental rate of migration to
owners of moving services.  The second component, ( ( ))i iN   , is the rental rate of 
migration to firms.  These are the only two sources of rent, aside from land rent, under 
the structure considered in Proposition 4.  Landowners distort the subsidy away from an 
externality-neutralizing level in order to capture some of these rents.  If we take as given 
a particular socially optimal growth path of population for a location, the landowners 
have incentives to set the subsidy below the optimal level when migration is positive and 
above the optimal level when migration is negative.
As with a no-subsidy competitive equilibrium, it is possible that the landowners' 
solution to (50) is consistent with a Pareto optimum.  This occurs if the subsidized 
externalities are equal across locations, for every t, when the landowners in each location 
simultaneously optimize.  However, this will happen if and only if the inframarginal 
                                                
28 Analogous to our assumption in the static model, we assume that landowners take as given the utility 
path available to migrants in other locations.
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value of a change in the “price” of migration is the same across locations in the 
subsidized equilibrium, which would be a mere coincidence unless the locations and 
equilibrium are fully symmetric.  Landowner control of local politics does not 
automatically satisfy the necessary conditions for an efficient outcome in the dynamic 
model, in contrast to the static model.
This conceptual exercise suggests that taxation policy will offset externalities only 
if it is designed by coalitions that include the interests of landowners, firms, and owners 
of moving resources, as well as any initial residents.  Assume initially that decisions 
made by such a coalition at t are fully enforceable at all future times st.29  As above, the 
coalition in each location takes as given the utility provided in other locations, so its 
objective may be written as
{ ( )}
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ))[1{
i
i i i i i i i i i
x s
t
L r s x s N s N s h s C s N s

    (52)
( )
( )
0
0
( ) *( )
( ) ( ( )) ( )   ( )}
iN s
s t i
i i i i i
i
V t V t
N s k N s k m dm e ds N t
A


        
  .
The first term of (52) is income of landowners, as in (50); the next term is the subsidy 
cost or tax revenue; the next two terms are firms’ profits including adjustment costs; the 
next two terms are the excess of revenues in the “moving services” industry over moving 
costs generated by net migration into the location when moving services are priced at 
marginal cost; and the last term is the relative utility benefit (translated into consumption-
equivalent units) for existing residents at time t.  Here, 0( ) ( )i iN t N t is the initial 
condition assuring that the path chosen by the coalition starts from the existing 
population.
As before, the paths ( ),  ( ),  and ( )i i iw s r s N s are endogenous and the objective (52)
is maximized subject to the initial condition, as well as the competitive equilibrium 
conditions (34), (48), and the right side of (37).
Proposition 5. The subsidy flow ( )ix s that solves (52) and associated constraints 
satisfies
ˆ ( )
( ) ( ) ( )i
i
N
i i N
i
u s
x s N s h s
A
   
 
, s t  . (53)
This is the dynamic analog of (23).  It indicates that the subsidy or tax on each resident at 
each point in time equals the instantaneous marginal net externality that person imposes 
on firms and other residents.
The necessary condition for efficiency, given by the Corollary to Proposition 3, 
holds trivially when all locations implement the tax/subsidy plan (53).  The coalition’s 
optimal subsidy exactly offsets the externality that causes migrant decisions to violate the 
socially optimal migration program.  Indeed, the competitive equilibrium and socially 
optimal population and land use paths are determined by the same set of conditions when 
                                                
29 We discuss later how to relax this assumption.
23
the subsidy (53) is imposed in the competitive system.  This is stated formally in 
Propostion 6.
Proposition 6.  In a subsidized competitive equilibrium with subsidies ( )ix s , the 
equilibrium land and population triples ( ( ), ( ), ( );   ,   )h fi i iL s L s N s i s t   satisfy:
( )[ ( ) ( )]h fi i i iN s L s L s L      (42)
( )i
i
N s N      (43)
ˆ ( )
( )
h
i
f
i
L
L
i
u s
h s
A
      (45)
( )[ ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( )]
                                              [ ( ( )) ( ( ))] ( )
h f m s
i i i i i is
i i i i i
A Q L m L m N m x m e dm
A k N s N s s


  
     
           (54)
where
             
( ( ), ( ), ( ))
ˆ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
                  ( )
( )
f
i
f
i i i i
h
i i i i
L
i i
Q h L m b m N m
L u L m a m N m
h m
N m A

 
and *( ) ( )s V s  .  Moreover, the triple ( ( ), ( ), ( );   ,   )h fi i iL s L s N s i s t   in a solution to 
the Pareto problem (39) – (44) also satisfies these four conditions when ix is set equal to 
the value specified by (53) and ( )1( ) ( )
s t
s
s A e m dm    , where  is the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the population constraint (43).30
(54) is the key migration equation in the model.  i iQ x is the flow of benefits 
from introducing an additional worker into location i at time m.  So the left side of (54) is 
the present value at time s of such benefits less the instantaneous utility value of the 
adjustment costs from introducing the worker at time s.  This net value of the extra 
worker must equal the utility alternative *( )V s in a competitive equilibrium, or the utility 
value of the shadow price ( )1 ( )
s t
s
A e m dm   of an additional worker in location 1 in the 
Pareto problem.  Since firm adjustment costs and migration costs enter symmetrically 
into (54), the dynamic character of the system, which we examine in the next section, 
relies only on the presence of at least one of these costs.
The optimally subsidized competitive equilibrium and Pareto optimal population 
and land paths are identical if the system in Proposition 6 has a unique solution.  If there 
is not a unique solution then there can be optimally subsidized competitive equilibria that 
are not the global Pareto optimum.  This possibility is not a mere curiosity.  We show in 
the next section that it can indeed occur, and we discuss the implications for local 
taxation policy.
The substantive conclusion is that political structures at each location can produce 
allocations consistent with social optimality even where congestion or agglomeration 
effects are important and locations are asymmetric, but that the decision-making process 
                                                
30 As in the solution to the Pareto problem, we assume that constraint qualification holds.  See footnote 26.
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must consider the interests of all those who may earn rents in the location.  Landowners 
are not the only recipients of economic rents when migration and employment adjustment 
are costly.  Owners of firms, owners of resources in the mobility industry, and initial 
residents earn rents as well.  The result in static models that landowners will choose an 
efficient tax structure is a by-product of the feature that landowners are the only 
recipients of local economic rent in static models.31  On the other hand, the interests of 
future migrants to the location need not be explicitly represented, since their ability to 
choose among competing locations protects their interests, provided the tax/subsidy 
contract adopted at a particular time is a binding commitment.  If the process begins with 
zero population, new migrants’ interests are fully protected by a binding commitment 
without any explicit representation.
This latter result may be taken as a repudiation of the claim that, given costs of 
mobility, it is necessary for future residents to have a say in the taxation policies of 
localities.  This conclusion, however, rests heavily on the assumption that taxation 
policies are set in accord with an enforceable contract that migrants know when they 
arrive.  Although it may be reasonable to assume that such commitments can be made for 
short periods, the problems of writing contingent contracts to deal with future 
uncertainties may prohibit long-term contracts.
It is beyond the scope of our treatment to extend the model to an uncertain world,
but we want to at least consider the degree to which our conclusions survive if the 
locality is unable to commit itself to a long-term tax policy.  Assume that the locality can 
commit itself to abide by some tax/subsidy policy only for the period from t to t, after 
which the decision will be made anew by a similarly constituted coalition, consisting of 
stakeholders and residents at time t.  The time t coalition only chooses xi(s) for t<st, 
and must take the value of xi(s) for st as given.  The coalition formed at t makes 
choices of xi(s) for t<st, and so on.
If the choice of xi(s) for st corresponds to the optimum that would have been 
chosen by the initial coalition at t, the coalition can obtain its global optimum by 
choosing xi(s) for t<st exactly as it would if it had control after t.  Under these 
circumstances, the solution is still (53), but with the time period limited to t<st.  As 
(53) holds for any t, later coalitions will in fact choose the same time path for xi(s), 
provided the future path is assured for them as well.  If coalitions at future times t, t, 
etc., are constituted like those at t, the solution for s>t will correspond to that which 
would be chosen by the coalition at t. 
In short, even if the period in which the commitment for taxation or subsidy is 
extremely short, the necessary conditions for efficiency will be satisfied provided the 
decision is made at each point in time by such a coalition.  Hence, new migrants need not 
have an assurance concerning the specific tax policy to be followed in the future.  It is 
sufficient merely that they be included in future coalitions that make taxation decisions.
                                                
31 If increasing costs of moving are due to congestion, there will be no profits in the moving industry.  
Omitting the moving industry from (52) alters the subsidy or tax chosen, presented in (53), but the coalition 
of residents, landowners and firm owners will choose a subsidy that satisfies the relevant efficiency 
condition (corresponding to (49), modified as appropriate).  In short, the decision process outlined here 
satisfies the necessary conditions for optimal subsidies even when moving costs are due to congestion 
effects.
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We have left open the question of how the coalition operates to maximize the 
present value of its aggregate wealth.  If we accept Wittman’s (1989) argument, we may 
merely assume that the political process of a democracy is efficient.  The mechanism we 
have described suggests that so long as efficient decisions are made at a given point in 
time and the efficiency of future decision processes is assured, there may be little need to 
establish long-term commitments.
VIII. Expectations, Local Taxation Policy, and Multiple Equilibrium Paths
As noted above, when local agglomeration effects are important, there may be multiple 
dynamic paths satisfying the equilibrium and efficiency conditions presented in 
Proposition 6.  In particular, for a given initial population distribution, there may be a 
large number of equilibrium migration paths, each associated with a set of internally 
consistent (rational) expectations.  Some of these paths may involve “cycling,” in which 
population at a location oscillates, even when exogenous factors ( ( )ia s and ( )ib s in our 
model) do not vary over time.32
The possibility of multiple equilibrium paths raises important questions about 
whether one equilibrium path Pareto dominates others and, if so, whether there is a 
mechanism that can select the welfare-superior path.  In particular, will local policy-
makers design tax/subsidy policies that induce a global Pareto optimum?  A full 
investigation of the question would require extended study, but we can present an 
example here that reveals some of the possibilities.
We begin by specifying reasonable model primitives for which the migration 
equation (54) is relatively simple but has multiple solutions.  We will focus on a 
particular location, suppressing subscript i and holding the systemic parameter ( )s   (or 
V*(s)) constant.  Assume production and utility have Cobb-Douglas functional forms plus 
additively separable per capita population externalities g and f, respectively.  Local 
amenities are taken to be time invariant and the land endowment and output price are 
normalized to unity.  The per capita functions are:
Production: 0.5( , , ) ( ) ( )f fh L b N L g N 
Utility: A=1, 0.5ˆ( , , ) ( ) ( )h hu L a N L f N 
Land Endowment: L = 1
Using the unit land endowment and these functional forms for production and utility in 
(42) and (45) of Proposition 6 gives 
1
2
h fL L
N
  as the land allocation at each instant 
of time in every competitive equilibrium and in every Pareto efficient allocation.  
Substituting this land allocation into the definition of Q following (54) yields
                          0.5( ) ( ) ( ) (2 )Q N f N g N N    ,                          (55)
which depends on time s only through the population level N(s) and therefore may be 
written Q(N(s)) or Q(N) as circumstances warrant.
                                                
32 The character of such multiple paths is investigated in some detail by Krugman (2006) and Matsuyama 
(1991).  In their models, movement between only two locations is examined, and they do not consider 
subsidy or taxation policies, but the multiple dynamic paths in the model considered here are qualitatively 
similar to those analyzed by Krugman and Matsuyama.
26
The externalities appear in Q (and thus in (54)) exclusively as a sum f + g, so we 
need only specify these as an aggregate.  We will take
                       2( ) ( ) 4 4f N g N N N     .           (56)
Agglomeration effects dominate with this specification up to the maximum at N = 2, 
beyond which congestion effects dominate.  Now we have
                                     2 0.5( ) 4 4 (2 )Q N N N N      . (57)
The optimal tax/subsidy policy (53) for the tax/subsidy world in this example is
2( ) 4 2x N N N  . (58)
Again, this function depends on time s only through N(s), so we may write x(N(s)) or 
x(N).
Finally, assume conditions in the other locations peg the equilibrium systemic 
utility at *( ) 0  V t t  , so (54) becomes
( )( ( )) ( ( )) [ ( ( )) ( ( ))] s t
t
N t k N t Q N s x N s e ds        . (59)
The left side is zero if and only if ( ) 0N t  , so the roots of the integrands Q(N) and Q(N)
+ x(N) are the steady-state population levels for the no-tax and optimal tax worlds, 
respectively.  These integrands are displayed in figure 1.33  Each has three roots.  As 
( ( )) ( ( ))N t k N t    is strictly increasing, the outer two steady states are locally stable, 
while the middle steady state is unstable.
The steady state’s roots (derived by numerical solution) are
Q(N): N = 0.033, N = 1.196, N = 2.659
Q(N) + x(N): N = 0.036, N = 0.439, N = 2.112.
It is straightforward to verify from (56) that the aggregate population externality f(N) + 
g(N) is increasing at N = 0.033 and is decreasing at N = 2.659, consistent with the 
observation above.  The optimal tax/subsidy policy increases population at the low-
population stable steady state to garner agglomeration benefits, and decreases population 
at the high-population stable steady state to reduce congestion costs.
There are multiple equilibrium migration paths in both the no-tax and optimal-tax 
worlds, one leading to each stable steady state and potentially different path(s) leading 
away from the unstable steady state.  The growth paths can be illustrated explicitly by 
specifying migration/adjustment costs ( ) ( )N k N    and the discount rate  in the 
migration equation (59) and then numerically solving the differential equation for N(t).  
Assume
( ) ( ) / 2N k N N      (60)
and 0.1  .  Growth paths with and without a taxation/subsidy policy are qualitatively 
similar in this example.  As our primary concern is with the impact of local intervention, 
we focus on the paths in the optimal tax/subsidy world.  Substituting (57), (58), and (60) 
into (59) gives the migration equation
                2 0.5 0.1( )( ) [ 4 8 ( ) 3 ( ) (2 ( )) ] s t
t
N t N s N s N s e ds
         . (59’)
The paths that numerically solve this differential equation are illustrated in figure 2.
                                                
33 Note that the horizontal scale of both figure 1 and figure 2 has been modified to show detail at lower 
population levels.
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The heavy lines show N  as a function of N with the time parameter t eliminated 
but varying along the illustrated paths.  Where the line is above the horizontal axis, 
population is growing, and where it is below the axis, population is declining.  Starting 
near zero population, we observe two equilibrium paths.  The lower one leads to the low-
population stable steady state, whereas the higher one leads to the high-population stable 
steady state.  In each case, as the population approaches the stable point, migration 
declines, and the stable population is approached but not reached in finite time.34
The path that leads to the low-population stable steady state from the right has a 
spiral that circles around the unstable steady state an infinite number of times (the full 
spiral cannot be illustrated in the figure) before approaching the low-population stable 
steady state.  Movement is clockwise around the spiral, so, if the system begins with zero 
net migration and population just below the unstable equilibrium, population grows and 
then declines, oscillations becoming progressively greater, until population finally 
approaches the lower stable population level.  It is important to recall that actors perfectly 
anticipate the entire future in all equilibrium paths, and Proposition 6 ensures that the 
path satisfies the conditions for a social optimum.  Nonetheless, the existence of multiple 
paths at a given initial population level and multiple steady states that can be reached 
from that population level shows that there is little assurance a particular path is a global 
optimum.  Expectations matter for placing the system on a globally optimal path.
Comparing the two possible paths at a population level below the smallest root 
provides the easiest interpretation of the relative benefits associated with alternative 
paths.  The present value of future benefit flows from adding a worker, 
( )[ ( ) ( )] m s
t
Q m x m e dm
   , is much higher on the higher path, which draws many more 
migrants from other locations so that the marginal adjustment cost of adding population 
is driven to a correspondingly high level.  Equation (58) shows that the flows of per-
resident subsidies are identical at a given population level on the two paths, as a 
consequence of the assumption in this example that exogenous factors do not change over 
time.  But the high-migration path attracts more migrants because they expect that future 
population growth will ultimately make the location more desirable due to returns to 
agglomeration (recall that agglomeration effects dominate congestion effects for 2N  ).  
The lower migration path reflects expectations that the location will never grow 
sufficiently for such large economies of agglomeration to take hold—expectations that 
are self-confirming.
Numerically calculating the present value of aggregate benefits received by 
individuals in the coalition as specified in (52) shows that these benefits are larger on the 
upper path than on any of the other paths at any common level of population.  The 
difference is largely due to higher rent earned by landowners.  Unlike the flows of 
benefits earned by other stakeholders, which approach zero as population nears a stable 
steady state, rent payments to landowners continue indefinitely.
Although this example clearly illustrates the possibility that one equilibrium path 
may Pareto dominate another, the Pareto dominance is only in location i since we are not 
considering welfare in other locations and varying population in location i will generally 
affect welfare in other locations.  However, it is easy to see that the Pareto-dominance 
                                                
34 Regarding the behavior of the system as it approaches a steady state, see Fukao and Benabou (1993), 
who provide a correction to Krugman (2006).
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can be global across all locations.  For example, if stakeholders in other locations are not 
influenced by the population distribution, then the high-population path in this example 
Pareto dominates all other equilibrium paths.35
It may appear that a higher level of population growth is always preferred by local 
policy makers, but this is not necessarily true.  If we look at the spiral path, and consider 
a population level close to the unstable steady state level of 0.439, there are a large 
number of possible points on the path, some with positive and some with negative net 
migration.  The measure of local stakeholders’ net benefits in (52) is highest on the path 
where net out-migration is as large as possible, that is, at the point on the bottom of the 
outermost spiral.  In particular, positive growth is not preferred to other points on the 
same path. In this example, if ultimate population decline will occur in the future, it is 
best that it occur as quickly as possible.  Oscillations in population along the spiral path 
merely waste resources.
This example shows that the encouraging result of Proposition 6 must be 
accompanied by important caveats when inferring its substantive import in the presence 
of multiple equilibrium paths.  Although Proposition 6 shows that any optimally 
subsidized equilibrium path satisfies the necessary conditions for efficiency, the example 
shows that multiple paths meeting these conditions are possible and that some of the 
alternatives may Pareto dominate others, both from the perspective of one locality and 
globally as well.  
On the positive side, Proposition 6 assures us that at least one of the subsidized 
competitive equilibrium paths is a global Pareto optimum. Furthermore, for certain initial 
population levels, even in a system like this one with multiple steady-state populations, 
the growth path is fully determined and it is therefore optimal.
In those cases where there are multiple possible equilibrium paths, there are 
internally consistent expectations associated with each.  The differences in these 
expectations across alternative competitive equilibria suggest the kinds of strategies that 
may be pursued by a locality to induce one path rather than another.  Consider efforts to 
achieve the high-growth path.  Insofar as advertising can convince employers and 
potential migrants that others believe this possibility will occur, advertising may create 
expectations of high growth that become self-fulfilling.  Hence, even advertising that 
provides little information about the location may be successful if it focuses communal 
expectations.
There may be other methods that can be used by localities to achieve a more 
desirable growth path if local government powers are expanded beyond the imposition of 
an optimal tax/subsidy scheme.  If a locality guarantees future levels of production costs 
and residents’ utilities by specifying a contingent subsidy/tax, with residents and 
employers insured against the possibility that anticipated growth may not occur, the 
higher growth path can be assured. Although such guarantees may be unusual, a number 
of institutions exist that may approximate these types of policies.  Municipalities provide 
                                                
35 This will occur, for example, if the systemic utility V*=0 is merely the utility available in one alternative 
location j which produces output with no congestion or agglomeration effects, has no migration or
adjustment costs for Nj in the relevant range, and in which per capita land use does not affect production or 
consumption. Then migration between i and j has no impact on the welfare of any resident initially living in 
j, nor does it affect the level of revenues received by those with resources in j.  Clearly, the high-migration 
path in location i then globally Pareto dominates the other paths.
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subsidies to new firms and to those expanding employment.  Where the local government 
floats bonds to subsidize economic development, failure of growth to occur may force 
absentee bondholders to absorb some of the risk associated with future growth rates.
Although the example is suggestive of how efforts by a locality may improve 
efficiency for that locality, it does not provide a framework for global efficiency analysis 
because the welfare in other locations is not specified.  Moreover, global efficiency 
analysis requires that we compare equilibria for the overall system taking account of 
reactions in one location to policies chosen by another location.  There may be many 
optimal equilibria, with dramatic differences in the benefits that accrue at alternative 
locations.  In contrast to the case considered above, the most important problem may not 
be how actors in one location can focus expectations on the best path in that locality but 
rather the possibility of a struggle between locations to determine which will prevail 
among alternative migration flows favoring different locations.
Consider a system consisting of two locations, each with the same land, 
consumption and production amenities as the location in the example above.  Using (54) 
and taking total system population between 0.27 and 2.59, we can show that there are 
three population distributions with zero net migration, just as in the example above.  An 
equal population distribution is unstable, whereas the two asymmetric distributions are 
stable.  For many initial population distributions, there are multiple paths, leading either 
one or the other of the locations to attract the lion’s share of the population.  In such 
cases, the highest growth path in a location is welfare-superior for initial residents and 
owners of resources at that location, as in the previous example, so the interests of 
stakeholders across locations are at odds.  The location that succeeds in convincing 
migrants that it will attain high growth will achieve the preferred path, while the other 
location will be forced onto the inferior population growth path.  This illustrates the point 
that expectations may play a decisive role in determining the winners and losers.
Of course, each location has incentives to induce its preferred path.  If such 
attempts involve costly activities, such as advertising, this could result in wasteful 
competition between localities.  One may be tempted to consider whether the services of 
a system planner would be valuable.  If simply identifying those cities where growth was 
“expected” to occur succeeded in focusing expectations, this might provide a useful 
coordinating function.  The market may provide an alternative source of coordination. If 
all localities attempt to refocus expectations by floating bonds, as suggested above, 
rational investors may be less likely to invest where competition for migrants makes a 
high growth path less certain.  If the process of making such investments is sequential, 
the first localities to elicit investments may then be successful.  Alternatively, 
competition in the bond market may focus expectations on a subset of locations.  
Providing a full description of such a process is well beyond the scope of the current 
model.
IX. Conclusion
In the static model, if landowners in a location can set taxes or subsidies for residents, 
their income-maximizing choices will compensate for any consumption or production 
externalities resulting from population congestion or agglomeration affects.  Such local 
decisions can support a globally efficient allocation:  Any globally efficient population 
distribution corresponds to a regime in which local landowners at each location choose 
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policies that maximize their income.  Our formal model both confirms this “conventional 
wisdom” and shows that it depends critically on the absence of migration costs.  In a 
dynamic model with migration costs, landowners with political power will not set taxes 
to induce efficient migration.  However, if power is shared by a set of local stakeholders 
who maximize their aggregate benefits, a result comparable to that of the static model 
holds.  Any set of efficient migration paths corresponds to a subsidized competitive 
equilibrium in which policy at each location maximizes the relevant coalition’s aggregate 
income.  These results have particular power when there is a unique population 
distribution (static model) or a unique set of migration paths (dynamic model) 
corresponding to the set of locally optimal policies.  In these cases, system-wide 
efficiency is ensured by local maximizing decisions.
Where there are multiple equilibria, it no longer is clear that local decisions will 
induce the social optimum.  Consider the static model implicit in the structure underlying 
figure 2.36  In the static model, the only stakeholders are landowners, and their incomes 
are much greater at the highest static population level, which is the rightmost steady state.  
This steady state is also socially optimal for the location under study.  However, there is 
another static population level (ignoring the middle—unstable—steady state) and it is not 
clear how landowners can induce the preferred one.  At the higher population level, the 
optimal plan imposes a tax on residents, reflecting negative net congestion effects, 
whereas the optimal plan associated with the lower population level provides a subsidy.  
The model provides no leverage for local landowners to obtain the more desirable 
outcome, nor does it provide a basis for predicting which outcome will occur.
Notwithstanding these negative results, the dynamic model does provide a 
mechanism on which efforts may build to achieve the social optimum.  Whereas the static 
model was silent about how or whether migration might allow for movements to a more 
desirable steady-state population, the dynamic model demonstrates that this is clearly 
possible.  Figure 2 shows that if a location finds itself at the inferior (lower) population 
level, rational forward-looking migrants may be induced to move into the location, 
yielding redistribution that is preferable for stakeholders in the location (even considering 
migration and adjustment costs) and that is possibly globally Pareto preferred.
For certain initial populations, the dynamic model may provide a unique path to a 
particular steady state even when there are multiple steady-state populations.  Figure 2 
illustrates this possibility.  For all population levels above the rightmost point on the 
spiral path there is a single subsidized migration path, and it leads to the upper steady-
state population.  If the initial population level similarly corresponds to a single dynamic 
path at each location, a globally efficient pattern of migration follows directly from 
optimal local decisions by the properly constituted coalitions at each location.
On the other hand, figure 2 shows that such an outcome need not always occur, so 
the intuition that explicit dynamics solve the problem is incorrect in general.  There may 
be multiple migration paths at a given initial population distribution that tend toward 
dramatically different steady-state population distributions.  The optimal subsidy or tax 
policy at a location may be consistent with multiple paths, even given an initial 
population distribution.  In our example, there are multiple paths consistent with optimal 
                                                
36 Interpreted within the static structure, Q + x is the benefits for residents in the location in question.  
Although the structure underlying this graph represents flows, these may be easily reinterpreted as static 
values.  
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local policies at initial population levels below the rightmost point on the spiral path, but 
the path leading to the largest steady-state population can Pareto dominate all others.37
In applying these ideas, it would be valuable to understand how widespread such 
indeterminacies are.  If large urban areas experience growth corresponding to the portion 
of a growth path where it is unique, we might conclude that growth in large urban areas is 
largely explained by the economic environment and initial conditions, with expectations 
playing no independent role.  If smaller locations can be represented on the same graph 
but at population levels where there is not a unique growth path, expectations would be of 
independent importance for these locations.  Investigating these issues might provide a 
fruitful area for future research.
                                                
37 Sufficient conditions for the high growth path to Pareto dominate the others in the example are provided 
in footnote 35.
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Figure 1: Benefit Flows (Q) and Subsidized Benefit Flows (Q+x)
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Figure 2: Subsidized Migration Paths
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. A competitive equilibrium allocation1 (ci, Lhi , L
f
i , Ni), ∀i (and U∗) is deﬁned by
(4), (6), (7), (15), and Walras’ Law:
u(ci, Lhi , ai, Ni) = U
∗ (A1)
Ni[L
f
i + L
h
i ] = Li (A2)
∑
i
Ni = N (A3)
P ∗h
L
f
i
=
uLhi
uci
(A4)
P ∗h(Lfi , bi, Ni) = P
∗h
Lfi
Li
Ni
+ ci. (A5)
(A5) is Walras’ Law, obtained by noting that the zero proﬁt condition on ﬁrms and the residents’ budget
constraints together imply that the value of output per capita in location i, P ∗h(Lf(wi, ri, bi, Ni), bi, Ni), in
equilibrium equals the value of residents’ and landowners’ consumption per capita in location i, riLi/Ni+ci,
and then substituting for ri from (14) and Ci from (5).2 Each of these equations, except (A3), applies for all
locations i. (A3) can be used to eliminate U∗, but it is convenient to retain U∗ for the eﬃciency discussion.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the program (8) – (12) are necessary for a solution, given constraint
qualiﬁcation.3 Using (11) to eliminate Lhi , the Lagrangian function is
L = N1
[
P ∗h(Lf1 , b1, N1)− c1
]
+ λ
[∑
i
Niu(ci, Li/Ni − Lfi , ai, Ni) − u¯
]
+
∑
i>1
γi
[
Ni
[
P ∗h(Lfi , bi, Ni)− ci
]
− Ri
]
+ µ
[
N −
∑
i
Ni
]
,
where λ, γi, and µ are the Lagrange multipliers on (9), (10), and (12), respectively. Setting γ1 = 1 for
notational convenience, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂L
∂Lfi
= −λNiuLhi + γiNiP
∗hLfi = 0, ∀i (A6)
1Note that we are defining the allocation here, not the equilibrium prices, so we require the equations that define the
equilibrium quantities.
2Although we have no reason to distinguish between quantity consumed and the value of consumption, Walras’ Law implies
equilibrium in the output market, even if the price paid by residents and landowners is not implicitly normalized to one.
3There is also a nonnegativity constraint on each of the choice variables. By assumption, these constraints do not bind at
competitive equilibrium allocations, which are the only allocations studied in this proposition, so we ignore the nonnegativity
constraints.
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2∂L
∂ci
= λNiuci − γiNi = 0, ∀i (A7)
∂L
∂Ni
= λNi
[
uNi − uLhi
Li
N2i
]
+ λu(ci, Li/Ni − Lfi , ai, Ni)
+γi
[
P ∗h(Lfi , bi, Ni)− ci +NiP ∗hNi
]
− µ = 0, ∀i (A8)
λ ≥ 0 (A9)
γi ≥ 0, for i > 1 (A10)
λ
[∑
i
Niu(ci, Li/Ni − Lfi , ai, Ni)− u¯
]
= 0 (A11)
γi
[
Ni
[
P ∗h(Lfi , bi, Ni)− ci
]
− Ri
]
= 0, for i > 1 (A12)
∑
i
Ni = N. (A13)
Consider an allocation that satisﬁes the competitive equilibrium conditions (A1) – (A5), and set utility u¯
and income Ri in the Pareto problem at their competitive equilibrium levels. That is, select
u¯ = NU∗ (A14)
and, since proﬁts are zero in a competitive equilibrium, select Ri to be landowners’ income riLi, where
ri = P ∗hLfi is the competitive equilibrium price. By (A5),
Ri = Ni
[
P ∗h(Lfi , bi, Ni) − ci
]
, ∀i > 1. (A15)
Taking note of (A1) and (A3), it is immediate that (A11) – (A13) are satisﬁed by a competitive equilibrium
allocation when the Pareto problem is evaluated at the corresponding competitive equilibrium levels of u¯
and Ri.
Now use (A7) for i = 1 (recalling that γ1 = 1) to deﬁne λ in terms of the competitive equilibrium
allocation as λ = 1/uc1, and note that this value of λ is positive so this deﬁnition satisﬁes (A9) as well as
(A7) for i = 1. Use this deﬁnition of λ and (A7) for i > 1 to deﬁne γi in terms of the competitive equilibrium
allocation as γi =
uci
uc1
, and note that this value of γi is positive so this deﬁnition satisﬁes (A10) as well as
(A7) for i > 1. Moreover, (A4) implies (A6) for these deﬁnitions of λ and γi. This leaves only (A8) for
the competitive equilibrium allocation to satisfy. Substitute these deﬁnitions of λ and γi into (A8); and use
(A1), (A4), and (A5); to show that (A8) evaluated at the competitive equilibrium allocation is
uciNi
[
P ∗hNi +
uNi
uci
]
= uc1µ− U∗, ∀i. (A8’)
3Since (A8’) is implied by (A6) – (A13), there is no set of Lagrange multipliers that satisﬁes the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions when the conditions are evaluated at an allocation satisfying (A1) – (A5) unless there is a real
number µ such that (A8’) is satisﬁed. By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem (for example, Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
Theorem M.K.2), this means an allocation satisfying (A1) – (A5) is not optimal when the threshold welfare
levels u¯ and Ri are set according to (A14) and (A15) unless there is a real number µ satisfying (A8’). If
one of these thresholds is set at some other level in the Pareto problem then (A11) or (A12) implies that
the corresponding multiplier must be zero if the allocation satisfying (A1) – (A5) is to satisfy (A6) – (A13).
This violates either λ > 0 (i.e., (A7) for i = 1) or γi > 0 (i.e., (A7) for i > 1). Thus, a necessary condition
for a competitive equilibrium allocation to be a solution is that the left side of (A8’) be the same for all
values of i. 
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1. Landowners’ consumption is diminished by the subsidy xi they
pay to consumers, so Walras’ Law (A5) becomes
P ∗h(Lfi , bi, Ni) = P
∗hLfi
Li
Ni
+ ci − xi. (A5’)
Landowners pay the subsidy, so their equilibrium income is Ri = riLi − Nixi. Using this in the Pareto
problem along with the new version of (A5) leaves (A15) unchanged. Using (A5’) in the derivation of (A8’)
yields
uci
[
Ni
[
P ∗hNi +
uNi
uci
]
− xi
]
= uc1µ− U∗, ∀i. (A8”)
The remainder of the proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Location subscripts, i, are suppressed throughout the proof. Begin by noting
some envelope theorem properties of the resident and ﬁrm optimization problems.
From (1), indirect utility is
U(w + x, r, a, N) = max
{c,Lh}
u(c, Lh, a, N) subject to c+ rLh = w + x. (A16)
Roy’s Identity for land demand is
Lh = − Ur
Uw
. (A17)
As consumption c is expressed in monetary units, optimal consumption satisﬁes
Uw = uc. (A18)
4The envelope theorem also yields
UN = uN (A19)
at the optimum.
From (3), cost per unit of output is
C(w, r, b, N) = min
{Lf}
w + rLf
h(Lf , b, N)
. (A20)
Shephard’s Lemma for land and labor demand is
Cr =
Lf
h
and Cw =
1
h
, (A21)
so
Cr
Cw
= Lf . (A22)
The envelope theorem also yields
CN = −w + rL
f
h2
hN = −C
h
hN (A23)
at the optimum, so
CN
Cw
= −ChN . (A24)
Now consider the ﬁrst order condition for the landowners’ optimization problem (22), which is
x =
N
[
L
N
∂r
∂x − 1
]
∂N
∂x
. (A25)
This condition involves changes in the endogenous variables r and N with respect to the landowners’ choice
variable x. The endogenous variables (w, r, N) are determined by (18) – (20). Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst two
equations of this system with respect to x yields:
Uw
∂w
∂x
+ Ur
∂r
∂x
+ UN
∂N
∂x
= −Uw (A26)
Cw
∂w
∂x
+ Cr
∂r
∂x
+ CN
∂N
∂x
= 0. (A27)
Using these two equations to eliminate ∂w∂x yields:
[
Cr
Cw
− Ur
Uw
]
∂r
∂x
− 1 =
[
UN
Uw
− CN
Cw
]
∂N
∂x
. (A28)
5Using (A17), (A22), and (20), this is:
L
N
∂r
∂x
− 1 =
[
UN
Uw
− CN
Cw
]
∂N
∂x
. (A29)
So the ﬁrst order condition (A25) becomes
x = N
[
UN
Uw
− CN
Cw
]
. (A30)
Now substitute (A18), (A19), and (A24) to obtain
x = N
[
ChN +
uN
uc
]
. (A31)
Finally, using (19) yields
x = N
[
P ∗hN +
uN
uc
]
.  (A32)
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (30) into (28) yields
max
{N˜fk (s)}
∫ ∞
t
[
N˜fk (s)hi(s) [P
∗(s) −Ci(s)]− ψ˜k
(
N˜f′k (s)
)]
e−ρ(s−t)ds.
The Euler condition for this problem is
hi(s) [P ∗(s) −Ci(s)] e−ρ(s−t) = d
ds
[
−ψ˜′k
(
N˜f′k (s)
)
e−ρ(s−t)
]
, ∀s ≥ t.
Integrating the Euler condition from t to ∞ yields (31), provided lims→∞ ψ˜′k
(
N˜f′k (s)
)
e−ρ(s−t) = 0.
There are also transversality conditions that are necessary for an optimum. We assume throughout
the paper that transversality conditions hold, and state them here once for completeness. Denoting the
integrand in (28) by F
(
s, N˜fk (s), N˜
f′
k (s)
)
and its partial derivative with respect to the third argument by
F3, the transversality conditions are
lim
s→∞
[
F
(
s, N˜fk (s), N˜
f′
k (s)
)
− N˜f′k (s)F3
(
s, N˜fk (s), N˜
f′
k (s)
)]
= 0, and
lim
s→∞ N˜
f
k (s) = N¯
f
k or lims→∞F3
(
s, N˜fk (s), N˜
f′
k (s)
)
= 0,
where N¯fk is a constant. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Deﬁne the aggregate adjustment cost function by
ψi(N
f ′
i (t)) =
∑
k
ψ˜k(Bk(N
f ′
i (t))),
6where Bk(N
f ′
i (t)) is the labor adjustment for ﬁrm k consistent with aggregate adjustment N
f ′
i (t) according
to both (32) and the equalized marginal adjustment cost rule. That is, the Bk functions are implicitly deﬁned
by the set of equations
y =
∑
k
Bk(y)
ψ˜′k(Bk(y)) = ψ˜
′
1(B1(y)), ∀k.
The ﬁrst of these equations implies 1 =
∑
k B
′
k(y). Diﬀerentiating the deﬁnition of ψi yields
ψ′i(y) =
∑
k
ψ˜′k(Bk(y))B
′
k(y)
= ψ˜′1(B1(y))
∑
k
B′k(y)
= ψ˜′1(B1(y)),
which establishes that the marginal aggregate adjustment cost equals the common adjustment cost of each
ﬁrm. Given ψ˜k(0) = ψ˜′k(0) = 0 and ψ˜
′′
k (0) > 0, Bk(0) = 0 is clearly the simultaneous solution to the
equations deﬁning Bk(y) for y = 0. Substituting this into the deﬁnition of ψi and using ψ′i(y) = ψ˜
′
1(B1(y))
and ψ˜k(0) = 0, ∀k establishes that the total and marginal aggregate adjustment cost are zero at y = 0.
Diﬀerentiating the second equation in the deﬁnition of Bk yields
ψ˜′′k (Bk(y))B
′
k(y) = ψ˜
′′
1 (B1(y))B
′
1(y), ∀k.
Using ψ˜′′k > 0, this implies B
′
k(y) has the same sign as B
′
1(y) for every k.
∑
k B
′
k(y) = 1 then implies that
this sign is positive. Diﬀerentiating the equality between marginal aggregate and marginal ﬁrm adjustment
cost then yields ψ′′i (y) = ψ˜′′k (Bk(y))B
′
k(y) > 0, which shows that the aggregate adjustment cost is strictly
convex. 
Proof of Proposition 3. A competitive equilibrium allocation4 (ci(s), Lhi (s), L
f
i (s), Ni(s)), ∀i (and V ∗(s)
and Ci(s)) is deﬁned by (34), both sides of (37), (38), (45), and a condition analogous to Walras’ Law (along
4See footnote 1.
7with the initial conditions):
Ni(s)
[
Lhi (s) + L
f
i (s)
]
= Li (A33)∫ ∞
s
[
ci(m) +
uˆ(Lhi (m), ai(m), Ni(m))
Ai
]
e−ρ(m−s)dm− V
∗(s)
Ai
= ki(N ′i(s)) (A34)∫ ∞
s
h(Lfi (m), bi(m), Ni(m)) [P
∗(m) −Ci(m)] e−ρ(m−s)dm = ψ′i(N ′i (s)) (A35)∑
i
Ni(s) = N (A36)
P ∗(s)hLfi (s) =
uˆLhi (s)
Ai
(A37)
h(Lfi (s), bi(s), Ni(s))Ci(s) = P
∗(s)hLfi (s)
Li
Ni(s)
+ ci(s).
(A38)
(A38) is analogous to Walras’ Law in the static model, obtained by noting that the deﬁnition of cost (30)
and the residents’ budget constraints together imply that, in equilibrium, the cost of output per capita in
location i at time s, hi(s)Ci(s), equals the value of residents’ and landowners’ consumption per capita in
location i at time s, ri(s)Li(s)/Ni(s) + ci(s), and then substituting for ri(s) from (29).5 Each of these,
except (A36), applies for all locations i and all times s. (A36) and (A38) can be used to eliminate Ci(s) and
V ∗(s), but it is convenient to retain Ci(s) and V ∗(s) for the eﬃciency discussion.
The Euler-Lagrange conditions (see Chiang 1992, section 6.1) for the program (39) – (44) are necessary
for a solution, given constraint qualiﬁcation. Using (42) to eliminate Lhi (s), the Lagrangian function is
L =
[
N1(s)P ∗(s)h(L
f
1 (s), b1(s), N1(s)) − Z1(s) −
∫ N′1(s)
0
k1(m)dm− ψ1(N ′1(s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)
+ λ
∑
i
[
AiZi(s) +Ni(s)uˆ(Li/Ni(s) − Lfi (s), ai(s), Ni(s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)
+
∑
i>1
γi
[
Ni(s)P ∗(s)h(L
f
i (s), bi(s), Ni(s)) − Zi(s) −
∫ N′i(s)
0
ki(m)dm− ψi(N ′i(s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)
− µ(s)
∑
i
Ni(s),
where λ, γi, and µ(s) are the Lagrange multipliers on (40), (41), and (43), respectively. Setting γ1 = 1 for
5This is “analogous to” but not exactly Walras’ Law because hi(s)Ci(s) is cost of output per capita but may not be market
value of output per capita since P∗(s) = Ci(s) is possible in the dynamic model. Walras’ Law need not hold at each instant
of time in the dynamic model because firms’ instantaneous profit margins can be either positive or negative, so aggregate
instantaneous consumption need not equal instantaneous production in a location or even aggregated across locations. Indeed,
production of output need not equal consumption even over the entire time horizon. A simple assumption that renders this
possible “disequilibrium” unimportant to our analysis is that firms’ “deep pockets” can be drawn upon to finance consumption
in excess of production. Alternatively, since our results hold for any particular path P∗(t) provided that the path is exogenous
to each location, we can select a price path that equates production and consumption at some appropriate level of aggregation.
8notational convenience, the Euler-Lagrange conditions are:
∂L
∂Lfi (s)
=
[
−λNi(s)uˆLhi (s) + γiNi(s)P
∗(s)hLfi (s)
]
e−ρ(s−t) = 0, ∀i, ∀s ≥ t (A39)
∂L
∂Zi(s)
= [λAi − γi] e−ρ(s−t) = 0, ∀i, ∀s ≥ t (A40)∫ ∞
τ
∂L
∂Ni(s)
(s)ds+
∂L
∂N ′i(s)
(τ ) = 0, ∀i, ∀τ ≥ t (A41)
λ ≥ 0 (A42)
γi ≥ 0, for i > 1 (A43)
λ
[∑
i
∫ ∞
t
[
AiZi(s) +Ni(s)uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds− V¯
]
= 0 (A44)
γi
[∫ ∞
t
[
Ni(s)P ∗(s)h(L
f
i (s), bi(s), Ni(s)) − Zi(s)
−
∫ N′i (s)
0
ki(m)dm− ψi(N ′i (s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds− Ri
]
= 0, for i > 1 (A45)
∑
i
Ni(s) = N, ∀s ≥ t, (A46)
where (A41) is expressed in integral form and the derivatives in (A41) are
∂L
∂Ni(s)
(s) = λ
[
uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s)) − uˆLhi (s)
Li
Ni(s)
+Ni(s)uˆNi (s)
]
e−ρ(s−t)
+ γi
[
P ∗(s)h(Lfi (s), bi(s), Ni(s)) +Ni(s)P
∗(s)hNi (s)
]
e−ρ(s−t) − µ(s)
(A47)
∂L
∂N ′i (s)
(τ ) = γi [−ki(N ′i (τ ))− ψ′i(N ′i (τ ))] e−ρ(τ−t). (A48)
Consider an allocation that satisﬁes the competitive equilibrium conditions (A33) – (A38), and set aggre-
gate utility V¯ , income Ri, and the resident/migrant aggregate money allocation Zi(s) in the Pareto problem
at their competitive equilibrium levels. In particular,
1. Set V¯ as
V¯ = NV ∗(t) +
∑
i
AiNi(t)ki(N ′i (t)); (A49)
2. Since instantaneous ﬁrm income is [P ∗(s) − Ci(s)]hi(s)Ni(s) − ψi(N ′i (s)), landowner income is ri(s)Li,
and moving service income is N ′i (s)ki(N
′
i (s)) −
∫ N′i (s)
0
ki(m)dm, set Ri as
Ri =
∫ ∞
t
[
[P ∗(s) − Ci(s)]h(Lfi (s), bi(s), Ni(s))Ni(s) − ψi(N ′i(s))
+ ri(s)Li +N ′i(s)ki(N
′
i (s)) −
∫ N′i (s)
0
ki(m)dm
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds, (A50)
9where Ci(s) is the competitive equilibrium production cost per unit of output and ri(s) = P ∗(s)hLfi (s) is
the competitive equilibrium price of land; and
3. Set6
Zi(s) = Ni(s)ci(s) −N ′i (s)ki(N ′i (s)). (A51)
Substituting for ci(s) from (A51) in (A38) and then substituting for Ci(s) and ri(s) in (A50) yields
Ri =
∫ ∞
t
[
Ni(s)P ∗(s)h(L
f
i (s), bi(s), Ni(s)) − Zi(s) −
∫ N′i(s)
0
ki(m)dm− ψi(N ′i(s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds. (A52)
Taking note of (A36), it is immediate that (A45) – (A46) are satisﬁed by the competitive equilibrium
allocation when the Pareto problem is evaluated at the corresponding equilibrium levels of V¯ , Ri, and Zi(s).
To verify that (A44) is satisﬁed by the competitive equilibrium allocation when the Pareto problem is
evaluated at the corresponding equilibrium levels of Zi(s) and V¯ , diﬀerentiate (A34) with respect to s to
obtain:
Aici(s) + uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s)) = ρ[V
∗(s) + Aiki(N ′i (s))] −
d
ds
[V ∗(s) + Aiki(N ′i (s))]. (A53)
Multiplying by Ni(s), subtracting AiN ′i (s)ki(N
′
i (s)), and multiplying by e
−ρ(s−t) yields
[
Ni(s)[Aici(s) + uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s))] − AiN ′i(s)ki(N ′i (s))
]
e−ρ(s−t) =[
Ni(s)
[
ρ[V ∗(s) + Aiki(N ′i (s))]−
d
ds
[V ∗(s) + Aiki(N ′i (s))]
]
−AiN ′i (s)ki(N ′i (s))
]
e−ρ(s−t).
(A54)
It is straightforward to verify that the right side of (A54) is
− d
ds
[
Ni(s)[V ∗(s) + Aiki(N ′i (s))]e
−ρ(s−t)
]
+N ′i (s)V
∗(s)e−ρ(s−t). (A55)
Substituting for Ni(s)ci(s) from (A51), (A54) becomes
[AiZi(s) +Ni(s)uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s))]e
−ρ(s−t) =
− d
ds
[
Ni(s)[V ∗(s) +Aiki(N ′i(s))]e
−ρ(s−t)
]
+N ′i(s)V
∗(s)e−ρ(s−t). (A56)
Integrating yields
∫ ∞
t
[AiZi(s) +Ni(s)uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s))]e
−ρ(s−t)ds =
Ni(t)[V ∗(t) + Aiki(N ′i (t))] +
∫ ∞
t
N ′i (s)V
∗(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds. (A57)
6This redefines the choice variable in the problem to be ci(s) rather than Zi(s).
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Therefore, using (A36) and (A49),
∑
i
∫ ∞
t
[AiZi(s) +Ni(s)uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s))]e
−ρ(s−t)ds = V¯ +
∫ ∞
t
∑
i
N ′i(s)V
∗(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds = V¯ , (A58)
where the last equality follows because
∑
iN
′
i(s) = 0 from (A36). This is (A44).
Now use (A40) for i = 1 (recalling that γ1 = 1) to deﬁne λ in terms of the competitive equilibrium
allocation as λ = 1
A1
, and note that this value of λ is positive so this deﬁnition satisﬁes (A42) as well as
(A40) for i = 1. Use this deﬁnition of λ and (A40) for i > 1 to deﬁne γi in terms of the competitive
equilibrium allocation as γi = AiA1 , and note that this value of γi is positive so this deﬁnition satisﬁes (A43)
as well as (A40) for i > 1. Moreover, (A37) implies (A39) for these deﬁnitions of λ and γi. This leaves only
(A41) for the competitive equilibrium allocation to satisfy.
Substitute these deﬁnitions of λ and γi into (A47) and (A48), and substitute the results into (A41) to
show that (A41) evaluated at the competitive equilibrium allocation is
∫ ∞
τ
[
uˆ(Lhi (s), ai(s), Ni(s)) − uˆLhi (s)
Li
Ni(s)
+Ni(s)uˆNi (s) +AiP
∗(s)[h(Lfi (s), bi(s), Ni(s))
+Ni(s)hNi (s)]
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds− Ai[ki(N ′i (τ )) + ψ′i(N ′i (τ ))]e−ρ(τ−t) = A1
∫ ∞
τ
µ(s)ds, ∀i, ∀τ ≥ t.
(A41’)
Substituting from (A37) and (A38), and from (A34) and (A35) evaluated at s = τ , yields
∫ ∞
τ
[uˆNi(s) + AiP
∗(s)hNi (s)]Ni(s)e
−ρ(s−t)ds = A1
∫ ∞
τ
µ(s)ds− V ∗(τ ), ∀i, ∀τ ≥ t. (A41”)
Since (A41”) is implied by (A39) – (A46), there is no set of Lagrange multipliers that satisﬁes the Euler-
Lagrange conditions when the conditions are evaluated at an allocation satisfying (A33) – (A38) unless there
is a path µ(s) satisfying (A41”). By necessity of the Euler-Lagrange conditions for a solution, this means
an allocation satisfying (A33) – (A38) is not optimal when the threshold welfare levels V¯ , Ri, and Zi(s) are
set according to (A49) – (A51) unless there is a path µ(s) satisfying (A41”). If one of these thresholds is set
at some other level in the Pareto problem then (A44) or (A45) implies that a multiplier must be zero if the
allocation satisfying (A33) – (A38) is to satisfy (A39) – (A48). This violates either λ > 0 (i.e., (A40) for
i = 1) or γi > 0 (i.e., (A40) for i > 1). Thus, a necessary condition for a competitive equilibrium allocation
to be a solution is that the left side of (A41”) be the same for all values of i. 
11
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 3. Landowners’ consumption is diminished by the subsidy xi(s) they
pay to consumers, so (A38) becomes
hi(L
f
i (s), bi(s), Ni(s))Ci(s) = P
∗(s)hLfi (s)
Li
Ni(s)
+ ci(s) − xi(s), ∀i, ∀s. (A38’)
Landowners pay the subsidy, so (A50) becomes
Ri =
∫ ∞
t
[
[P ∗(s) − Ci(s)]h(Lfi (s), bi(s), Ni(s))Ni(s)− ψi(N ′i (s))
+ [ri(s)Li − xi(s)Ni(s)] +N ′i(s)ki(N ′i(s)) −
∫ N′i (s)
0
ki(m)dm
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds.
(A50’)
Using this in the Pareto problem along with (A38’) leaves (A52) unchanged. Using (A38’) in the derivation
of (A41”) yields
∫ ∞
τ
[uˆNi(s) + AiP
∗(s)hNi (s)]Ni(s)e
−ρ(s−t)ds−Ai
∫ ∞
τ
xi(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds = A1
∫ ∞
τ
µ(s)ds−V ∗(t), ∀i, ∀τ ≥ t.
(A41”’)
The remainder of the proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The location subscript i is suppressed throughout the proof. From (24) and (47),
and (30), respectively,
U(s)
A
= x(s) + w(s) − r(s)Lh(s) + uˆ(s)
A
h(s)[P ∗(s) − C(s)] = h(s)P ∗(s) −w(s) − r(s)Lf (s),
where U(s) is shorthand for U(w(s) + x(s), r(s), a(s), N(s)). Adding these equations, using (36), and rear-
ranging yields an alternative expression for the integrand in (50):
Lr(s) − x(s)N(s) = N(s)
[
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s)
]
−N(s)
[
U(s)
A
+ h(s)[P ∗(s) − C(s)]
]
. (A59)
Integration by parts of the second expression in the integrand yields:
∫ ∞
t
N(s)U(s)e−ρ(s−t)ds = N(t)V (t) +
∫ ∞
t
N ′(s)V (s)e−ρ(s−t)ds (A60)∫ ∞
t
N(s)h(s)[P ∗(s) − C(s)]e−ρ(s−t)ds = N(t)
∫ ∞
t
h(s)[P ∗(s) − C(s)]e−ρ(s−t)ds
+
∫ ∞
t
N ′(s)
[ ∫ ∞
s
h(m)[P ∗(m) − C(m)]e−ρ(m−s)dm
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds, (A61)
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where V (s) =
∫∞
t U(s)e
−ρ(s−t)ds. Using the right side of (37), (48), (A60), (A61), and N(t) = 0 in (A59),
the objective in (50) can be written∫ ∞
t
[
N(s)
[
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s)
]
−N ′(s)
[
V ∗(s)
A
+ k(N ′(s)) + ψ′(N ′(s))
]]
e−ρ(s−t)ds.
These manipulations have yielded an objective that does not depend on the endogenous variables x(s)
and w(s) (r(s) is still present as an argument of uˆ(s) and h(s)). Essentially, (37) and (48) have been used
to eliminate x(s) and w(s). The objective is now written in standard form for a variational problem, with
an integrand G that depends only on s, N(s), and N ′(s); provided we regard r(s) as determined from N(s)
by (34). The Euler condition is GN = ddsGN′ .
We have
GN =
[
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s) +N(s)
∂
∂N
(
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s)
)]
e−ρ(s−t).
By (34),
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s) =
1
A
[
uˆ(Lh(s), a(s), N(s)) − Ar(s)Lh(s)]
+
[
P ∗(s)h(Lf (s), b(s), N(s)) − r(s)Lf (s)]+ r(s) L
N(s)
.
The ﬁrst bracketed term is maximized over Lh by the residents’ actions, and the second bracketed term is
maximized over Lf by the ﬁrms’ actions. Hence, by the envelope theorem, Lh is ignored in the ﬁrst term
and Lf is ignored in the second term when diﬀerentiating with respect to N . So
∂
∂N
(
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s)
)
=
uˆN (s)
A
+ hN(s)P ∗(s) − r(s) L
N(s)2
−
[
Lh(s) + Lf (s) − L
N(s)
]
∂r
∂N
.
Using (34) again, and substituting into GN , yields
GN =
[
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s) +N(s)
[
uˆN (s)
A
+ hN(s)P ∗(s)
]
− r(s) L
N(s)
]
e−ρ(s−t). (A62)
Turning to the right side of the Euler condition, we have
GN′ = −
[
V ∗(s)
A
+ k(N ′(s)) + ψ′(N ′(s)) +N ′(s) [k′(N ′(s)) + ψ′′(N ′(s))]
]
e−ρ(s−t)
= −
[
V (s)
A
+
∫ ∞
s
h(m)[P ∗(m) −C(m)]e−ρ(m−s)dm+N ′(s) [k′(N ′(s)) + ψ′′(N ′(s))]
]
e−ρ(s−t)
by (37), and
= −
[ ∫ ∞
s
[
x(m) +
uˆ(m)
A
+ h(m)P ∗(m) − r(m) L
N(m)
]
e−ρ(m−s)dm
+N ′(s) [k′(N ′(s)) + ψ′′(N ′(s))]
]
e−ρ(s−t) by (25), (24), (30), and (34).
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So
d
ds
GN′ =
[
x(s) +
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s) − r(s) L
N(s)
]
e−ρ(s−t) − d
ds
(
N ′(s) [k′(N ′(s)) + ψ′′(N ′(s))] e−ρ(s−t)
)
.
(A63)
Equating (A62) and (A63), the Euler condition is
[
N(s)
[
uˆN(s)
A
+ hN(s)P ∗(s)
]
− x(s)
]
e−ρ(s−t) = − d
ds
(
N ′(s) [k′(N ′(s)) + ψ′′(N ′(s))] e−ρ(s−t)
)
.
Integrating over s from τ to inﬁnity yields (51). 
Proof of Proposition 5. The location subscript i is suppressed throughout the proof. Use (A59) to write
the objective (52) as
∫ ∞
t
[
−N(s)U(s)
A
+N(s)
[
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s)
]
− ψ(N ′(s)) +N ′(s)k(N ′(s)) −
∫ N′(s)
0
k(m)dm
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds
+N0(t)
V (t) − V ∗(t)
A
.
Now use (A60), N(t) = N0(t), (48) and (25) (noting that the wage argument of instantaneous indirect utility
is w(s) + x(s) when there is a tax/subsidy policy) to write the objective as
∫ ∞
t
[
−N ′(s)V
∗(s)
A
+N(s)
[
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s)
]
− ψ(N ′(s)) −
∫ N′(s)
0
k(m)dm
]
e−ρ(s−t)ds−N0(t)V
∗(t)
A
.
As in the proof of Proposition 4, these manipulations have yielded an objective that does not depend on
the endogenous variables x(s) and w(s) (r(s) is still present as an argument of uˆ(s) and h(s)). Essentially,
(48) has been used to eliminate x(s) and w(s). Only this one constraint is needed to eliminate both of these
endogenous variables because x(s) and w(s) enter both the objective and the constraint exclusively in the
form x(s) + w(s). Moreover, the objective is now written in standard form for a variational problem, with
an integrand G that depends only on s, N(s), and N ′(s), provided we regard r(s) as determined from N(s)
by (34) (the constant outside of the integral is ignored for the purpose of ﬁnding a maximum). The Euler
condition is GN = ddsGN′ .
GN is identical to GN in the proof of Proposition 4, and is therefore given by (A62).
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Consider the right side of the Euler condition and note
GN′ = −
[
V ∗(s)
A
+ ψ′(N ′(s)) + k(N ′(s))
]
e−ρ(s−t)
= −
[
V (s)
A
+
∫ ∞
s
h(m)[P ∗(m) − C(m)]e−ρ(m−s)dm
]
e−ρ(s−t) by (25), (48) and the right side of (37)
= −
∫ ∞
s
[
x(m) +
uˆ(m)
A
+ h(m)P ∗(m) − r(m) L
N(m)
]
e−ρ(m−t)dm by (25), (24), (30), and (34).
So
d
ds
GN′ =
[
x(s) +
uˆ(s)
A
+ h(s)P ∗(s) − r(s) L
N(s)
]
e−ρ(s−t). (A64)
Equating (A62) and (A64) yields (53). 
Proof of Proposition 6. From the proof of Proposition 3 and its corollary, a subsidized competitive
equilibrium allocation satisﬁes (A33) – (A37) and (A38’). (A33) is (42), (A36) is (43), and (A37) is (45).
This leaves only (54) to establish for a subsidized competitive equilibrium. Substituting for hi(m)Ci(m) in
(A35) from (A38’), and then for
∫∞
s ci(m)e
−ρ(m−s)dm from (A34) in the resulting expression, yields (54)
with Γ(s) = V ∗(s).
From the proof of Proposition 3, a solution to the Pareto problem (39) – (44) satisﬁes (A39) – (A46)
and (42). (A46) is (43). That proof also establishes λ = 1/A1 and γi = Ai/A1. Substituting these values
into (A39) yields (45). This leaves only (54) to be established as a property of a solution to (39) – (44).
The proof of Proposition 3 establishes (A41’) for a solution to (39) – (44). Substituting for uˆLhi (s) in
(A41’) from (45) and multiplying through by eρ(τ−t) yields (54) when xi(m) is given by (53) and Γ(s) =
A1e
ρ(s−t) ∫∞
s
µ(m)dm. 
